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Control of Break-Away State Antitrust
Litigation: An Issue of Federalism
By C. DOUGLAS FLOYD*
Antitrust plaintiffs, attempting to avert or circumvent unfavorable
results in federal court, have with increasing frequency begun "break-
away" state court actions under less restrictive state laws. Defendants
have sought to avoid the consequences of such break-away actions
through removal of the state action to federal court. This removal tac-
tic was summarily approved by the Supreme Court in 1981 in Federated
Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie.1
This Article criticizes the Court's disposition of the removal issue
in Moitie as a departure from accepted notions of concurrent federal
and state authority. This new direction, as exemplified in the micro-
cosm of antitrust law, should be rejected by the federal courts in favor
of other procedural alternatives.
Part I of the Article describes the origin and nature of the break-
away problem. Parts II and III analyze the Moitie decision and criti-
cize the Supreme Court's use of the "artful pleading" doctrine as a
ground for removal of break-away state actions. Part IV reviews one
district court's attempt to reconcile Moitie with established law. Part V
considers alternative procedural vehicles for the control of such dupli-
cative antitrust proceedings. The Article concludes that the application
of res judicata and the use of injunctions, stays, and party joinder are
better methods than removal for balancing the interests of federalism
and sound judicial administration in the antitrust field and other areas
of concurrent federal-state jurisdiction.
The Origin and Nature of the Break-Away Problem
As an outgrowth of current restrictive interpretations of the federal
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. B.S.,
1964, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; LL.B., 1967, Stanford University. The re-
search assistance of Michael Mosman of the third-year class of the J. Reuben Clark Law
School is gratefully acknowledged.
1. 452 U.S. 394 (1981).
antitrust laws by the United States Supreme Court,2 private antitrust
plaintiffs have with increasing frequency sought to recover damages for
their alleged injuries by commencing state court actions under state an-
titrust, tort, and contract theories.3 Not infrequently, such state plain-
tiffs had been plaintiffs in a federal antitrust action based on the same
facts, but filed their break-away state law claims in an effort to avoid an
unfavorable result in the federal forum.
The replacement of per se rules with the "rule of reason" ap-
proach4 in a broad range of antitrust cases in the federal courts,5 and
the perceived hostility of the current administration to many Warren
Court formulations favorable to antitrust plaintiffs,6 have no doubt
played a contributing role in the increase of break-away actions. Yet
the most immediate cause has been the Supreme Court's decision in
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.7 In Illinois Brick the Court held that, sub-
ject to very narrow exceptions, only a "direct purchaser" from an alleg-
edly price-fixing defendant may sue to recover damages under the
federal antitrust laws. A remote purchaser will not be permitted to
2. See infra notes 4-6 & accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981); Alton Box
Board Co. v. Esprit De Corp., 682 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982); Goldberg v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 678
F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3304 (U.S. Oct. 18, 1982); In re Corru-
gated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. deniedsub nom. Three J
Farms, Inc. v. Plaintiffs Steering Comm., 456 U.S. 936 (1982); Harper Plastics, Inc. v.
Amoco Chem. Corp., 657 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1981); California v. California & Hawaiian
Sugar Co., 588 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979); Iowa v. Binney &
Smith, Inc., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,781 (S.D. Iowa 1982); Retail Clerks Union v.
Exxon Corp., Civ. No. C-82-0480-TEH (N.D. Cal. 1982); Salveson v. Western States Bank-
card Ass'n, 525 F. Supp. 566 (N.D. Cal. 1981), appealpending, Nos. 82-4067, 82-4113 (9th
Cir. argued and submitted Dec. 17, 1982); Louis v. Cuisinarts, Inc., Civ. No. C-80-3929-
MHP (N.D. Cal. 1981); Pate v. Boise Cascade Corp., Civ. No. C-81-2732-R-S (N.D. Cal.
1980); In re Wiring Device Antitrust Litig., 498 F. Supp. 79 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Three J Farms,
Inc. v. Alton Box Board Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,423 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd, 609
F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980); Boccardo v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
134 Cal. App. 3d 1037, 184 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1982); Greenberg v. Leviton Mfg. Co., Civ. No.
759734 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco).
4. The "rule of reason" test was designed to determine whether or not a restrictive
trade practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition. See Chicago Bd. of Trade
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
5. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 19-21
(1979); Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977).
6. See Metzenbaum, Is William Baxter Anid4Antitrust?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1981, at
2, col. 3. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has sought to influence the
outcomes of private antitrust actions by participating as amicus curiae. See, e.g., Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 686 F.2d 286 (1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1271 (1983)
(No. 82-1031); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-rite Serv. Corp., 684 F.2d 1226 (1982), cert. granted,
103 S. Ct. 1249 (1983) (No. 82-914).
7. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
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prove that part of an anticompetitive overcharge was "passed on" to it
by the direct purchaser."
The Illinois Brick decision has created difficult questions of appli-
cation in federal courts,9 as well as considerable-but as yet unavail-
ing-pressure for legislative modification.' 0 In view of this
controversy, it is not surprising that not all of the states have followed
the federal restriction. Shortly after Illinois Brick was decided, for ex-
ample, the California legislature amended the state antitrust statute, the
Cartwright Act,' to expressly permit recovery by remote purchasers,12
an invitation that private antitrust plaintiffs have not hesitated to
accept.' 3
The rise of the break-away state antitrust action has created a sig-
nificant conflict between the need for efficient judicial administration
and the precepts of federalism. This problem is evidenced in the rap-
idly growing body of federal and state antitrust case law,14 and may be
replicated in other areas such as civil rights.' 5 The conflict stems from
the maintenance of both state and federal actions arising from the same
8. Id. at 736-48.
9. See In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1156-59 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980).
10. E.g., Clayton Act Amendments of 1978, H.R. REP. No. 1397, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 1 (H.R. 11942 seeking to overturn the Illinois Brickdecision); Antitrust Enforcement Act
of 1978, S. REP. No. 934, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (S. 1874 seeking to overturn Illinois
Brick).
11. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700-16760 (West 1964 & Supp. 1983).
12. Section 16750(a) was amended in 1978 to provide that "such action [antitrust] may
be brought by any person who is injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden or declared unlawful by this chapter, regardless of whether such injured person
dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant." 1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 536, § 1 (codified at CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a) (West Supp. 1983)).
13. See, e.g., Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981); Alton Box
Board Co. v. Esprit De Corp., 682 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982); Goldberg v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 678
F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1982); California v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Co., 588 F.2d 1270
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979); Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n,
525 F. Supp. 566 (N.D. Cal. 1981), appealpending, Nos. 82-4067, 82-4113 (9th Cir. argued
and submitted Dec. 17, 1982); Boccardo v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 3d 1037, 184
Cal. Rptr. 138 (1982).
14. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 3.
15. In the civil rights area, the Supreme Court has recently restricted the availability of
relief under the equal protection clause by requiring proof of the defendant's discriminatory
intent. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976). Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (no requirement that discriminatory intent be shown in an action
arising under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). A discharged employee, unable to
prove such intent, might bring a state court action for wrongful termination. As in the anti-
trust field, federal remedies for aggrieved employees are becoming more restricted while
state remedies are expanding. See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d
443, 448-51, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 725-26 (1980); Petermann v. Teamsters, Local 396, 174 Cal.
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alleged wrong. Frequently the state plaintiff's action is only one of
many similar actions against the same defendants based on identical
underlying facts.16 If such multiple actions are pending in various fed-
eral district courts, they are customarily transferred to a single federal
district judge for coordinated or consolidated pre-trial proceedings.
Such transfers are made "for the convenience of parties and witnesses"
and to "promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions" pursu-
ant to the multidistrict transfer statute.17 Coordination and consolida-
tion promote judicial economy and protect defendants from duplicative
discovery and other pre-trial demands in multiple forums. 18 The trans-
fers also alleviate the risk of duplicative recovery and significantly in-
crease the possibility of comprehensive disposition of the litigation
through settlement, summary judgment, or trial in a single forum. 19
If the break-away state case is allowed to proceed independently
of the federal action, however, the goals of the federal multidistrict
transfer statute may be partially or entirely frustrated. In an attempt to
avoid this result, federal defendants have employed an arsenal of pro-
cedural weapons to choke off break-away actions. For instance, de-
fendants have attempted to remove the state action to federal district
court2° (followed by requests to the multidistrict panel to transfer the
action to the court hearing the coordinated pre-trial proceedings), 2' or
have moved to stay the state proceedings,22 dismiss the state proceeding
on res judicata grounds, 23 enjoin the state proceedings, 24 or join possi-
App. 2d 184, 188 344 P.2d 25, 27-28 (1959); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho
330, 333, 563 P.2d 54, 57-58 (1977).
16. See Three J Farms, Inc. v. Alton Box Board Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T
62,423 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 609 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 911 (1980), in which the court noted that "plaintiffs lift from the unified complaint in
M.D.L. No. 310 entire paragraphs without any change of language or even punctuation."
Id. at 76,550.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976).
18. 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3861 (1976) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER] (citing H. R. REP. No. 1130, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1898, 1899-1900).
19. See generally 15 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, §§ 3861-3868.
20. See, e.g., Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 525 F. Supp. 566, 570 (N.D.
Cal. 1981), appealpending, Nos., 82-4067, 82-4113 (9th Cir. argued and submitted Dec. 17,
1982) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 124-50).
21. See, e.g., Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981); Three J
Farms, Inc. v. Alton Box Board Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas. 62,423 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd, 609
F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980).
22. See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1332, 1334 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. deniedsub nom. Three J Farms, Inc. v. Plaintiff's Steering Comm., 456 U.S. 936
(1982).
23. See, e.g., Boccardo v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 3d 1037, 1049-51, 184
Cal. Rptr. 138, 147-48 (1982) (discussed infra text accompanying 157-77).
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bly duplicative claimants as "indispensable parties" to the other
actions.25
The petition for removal appears to have become a favored de-
vice,26 despite the well-established doctrine that the plaintiff is the
master of his own complaint, and may not avoid removal on federal
question grounds by electing to ignore an available federal remedy and
to proceed instead solely under state law.27 Although removal of a
break-away state antitrust action would appear to fly in the face of this
principle of federal jurisdiction, such removal received an unexpected
boost in 1981 when the Supreme Court, in its customary end-of-term
flurry of opinions, announced its decision in Federated Department
Stores, Inc. v. Moitie.28
As shown below, there are substantial reasons to question the
Court's disposition of the removal issue in Moitie. Nonetheless, at least
one court followed Moitie in permitting such removal in antitrust
cases.29 If this trend were to result in an entrenched construction of the
removal statute, 30 it could be applied by analogy to other areas of con-
current federal and state jurisdiction, such as civil rights litigation. The
Moitie removal doctrine thus portends a significant shift in the alloca-
tion of power between federal and state legislative and judicial
authority.
Fortunately, removal is not the only vehicle for control of wasteful
concurrent state litigation. Several better approaches are available that
have not yet received adequate attention by the courts or commenta-
tors. Reflection on the questions raised by these alternatives provides
insight into the range, power, and flexibility of the modem procedures
and jurisdictional doctrines that may be brought to bear on this impor-
24. See, e.g., Alton Box Board Co. v. Esprit De Corp., 682 F.2d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir.
1982) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 232-37).
25. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. App. 3d 443, 447-53,
183 Cal. Rptr. 318, 321-22 (1982) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 229-38).
26. See, e.g., Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 525 F. Supp. 566 (N.D. Cal.
1981), appealpending, Nos. 82-4067, 82-4113 (9th Cir. argued and submitted Dec. 17, 1982);
Three J Farms, Inc. v. Alton Box Board Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,423 (D.S.C.
1978), rev'd, 609 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980); see also Moitie v.
Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 394 (1981).
27. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 103 S. Ct. 2841,
2853 (1983); Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113 (1936); see also Vitarroz v. Borden,
Inc., 644 F.2d 960, 963-65 (2d Cir. 1981); La Chemise La Coste v. Alligator Co., 506 F.2d
339, 343-44 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 937 (1975).
28. 452 U.S. 394 (1981).
29. See, e.g., Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 525 F. Supp. 566 (N.D. Cal.
1981), appealpending, Nos. 82-4067, 82-4113 (9th Cir. argued and submitted Dec. 17, 1982).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976).
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tant new conflict between the precepts of federalism and the exigencies
of efficient judicial administration.
The Moitie Decision
The Case Below
The Moitie case arose from a complex background of unusual pro-
cedural maneuvering in state and federal courts. In 1976, the United
States filed civil and criminal complaints alleging that defendants had
conspired to fix the retail price of women's clothing in violation of sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act.31 Seven private treble-damage actions
based on substantially the same allegations promptly followed. 32 Five
of these complaints, including the Brown I complaint, were filed in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California,
and alleged violations of the Sherman Act. Two of the actions, includ-
ing Moitie I, were filed in California superior court.33 The Aoitie I
state complaint did not allege a violation of federal law, but rather was
based entirely on California state antitrust law.34 Defendants removed,
claiming both diversity of citizenship and federal question jurisdic-
tion.35 Plaintiff Moitie made no motion to remand.
Following removal, the federal district court consolidated all seven
actions36 and granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted.37 The court dismissed the
consolidated action on the theory (later rejected by the United States
Supreme Court in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. 38) that plaintiff retail pur-
chasers had failed to show injury to any business in which they were
engaged. 39
The plaintiffs in four of the original federal actions and one of the
state actions appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, but the Moitie and Brown plaintiffs took a different ap-
31. Petition for Certiorari at 2-3, Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394
(1981). Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), prohibits contracts in restraint of
interstate commerce.
32. Petition for Certiorari at 2-3, Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394
(1981).
33. Id.
34. Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Remand, July 8, 1977, reprinted as Appendix
C to Petition for Certiorari at 13a, Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394
(1981).
35. Moitie v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d at 1268.
36. Id.
37. Weinberg v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 880, 886 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
38. 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
39. Weinberg v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 426 F. Supp. at 886.
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proach. Instead of appealing, they filed new complaints in California
municipal court (Mofife I1 and Brown I1) that studiously omitted any
mention of federal or state antitrust theories of recovery.4° Although
the state complaints in Moitfe II and Brown II included the same fac-
tual allegations as the previous federal complaints, they were based
solely on state law theories of fraud and deceit, unfair business prac-
tices, restitution, and "civil conspiracy."4'
Defendants once again removed on federal question and diversity
grounds and moved to dismiss, this time on the theory that the unap-
pealed judgments in Moftie I and Brown I were res judicata in Moiie
II and Brown 11.42 Plaintiffs countered by moving to remand on the
grounds that less than $10,000 was in controversy and that the actions
arose solely under state law.43 The federal district court denied the mo-
tions to remand, holding that by continuing to rely on allegations
modeled on the government complaints in federal court, the Moftie and
the Brown plaintiffs had "cast the character"44 of their state complaints
as federal:
Artful pleading by plaintiffs which adds four new state causes of ac-
tion and deletes specific reference to violations of federal antitrust
laws cannot convert their essentially federal law claims into state law
claims. From start to finish, plaintiffs have essentially alleged viola-
tions by defendants of federal antitrust laws.45
The district court then granted the motion to dismiss on res judicata
grounds.46
This time the Moitie and Brown plaintiffs appealed,47 but before
their appeal was heard by the Ninth Circuit that court had reversed the
district court's dismissal of the original consolidated action on author-
ity of the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Reiter v. Sonotone.4 8
In the Moifie II and Brown II appeals, the Ninth Circuit summarily,
40. Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Remand, July 8, 1977, reprinted as Appendix
C to Petition for Certiorari at 14a-15a, Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394
(1981).
41. Id.
42. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dis-
miss, July 8, 1977, Joint Appendix at 126-37, Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S.
394 (1981).
43. Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Remand, July 8, 1977, reprinted as Appendix
C to Petition for Certiorari at 15a, Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394
(1981).
44. Id. at 16a.
45. Id. at 17a.
46. Id.
47. Moitie v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d at 1268.
48. 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
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and without citation of authority, affirmed the propriety of removal on
the theory that "the court below correctly held that the claims
presented were federal in nature, arising solely from price fixing on
defendants' part. '49 It then proceeded to reverse the res judicata dis-
missals. The court held that while "strict application" of the doctrine
of res judicata would give preclusive effect to the unappealed dismissals
in Moitie I and Brown I, the positions of the Moitie II and Brown II
plaintiffs were identical with those of the other plaintiffs in the consoli-
dated action who had successfully appealed. Concerns of "public pol-
icy and simple justice" therefore required that the non-appealing
plaintiffs receive the benefit of the earlier reversal as well.50
In the Supreme Court
In this posture the Mo/ie case came before the United States
Supreme Court. The sole question presented in the petition for certio-
rari,5' and addressed by the Court, was the correctness of the Ninth
Circuit's "novel exception to the doctrine of res judicata. ' '5 2 The Moitie
and Brown plaintiffs filed no cross-petition challenging the court of ap-
peals' summary decision on the propriety of removal. In view of both
this fact and the very abbreviated reference to the removal issue con-
tained in the briefs on the merits, it is not surprising that the Supreme
Court's reversal of the Ninth Circuit's judgment was based almost en-
tirely on the res judicata point. The Court held that the federal dismis-
sal in Brown I should be accorded claim preclusive effect in Brown I.53
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for six members of the Court vigor-
ously condemned the principle of "equitable tempering" of res judicata
endorsed by the court of appeals. In his view the Court's "rigorous
application" of res judicata in its prior decision in Reed v. Allen 54
"makes clear that this Court recognizes no general equitable doctrine,
49. Moitie v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d at 1268.
50. Id. at 1269-70.
51. Petition for Certiorari at 2, Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394
(1981).
52. MAoitie, 452 U.S. at 398.
53. Moitie, 452 U.S. at 395. While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, Moite
II was voluntarily dismissed, leaving Brown II as the only subject of the petition. Id. at 397
n.l. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Burger,
and Justices Stewart, White, Powell, and Stevens joined. Justice Blackmun, joined by Jus-
tice Marshall, concurred in the judgment, writing separately only to note that more compel-
ling facts might dictate a different result. Justice Brennan dissented as to the propriety of
removal. See infra text accompanying notes 61, 81-86.
54. 286 U.S. 141 (1932).
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such as that suggested by the Court of Appeals." 55 Instead, "[t]he doc-
trine of res judicata serves vital public interests beyond any individual
judge's ad hoc determination of the equities in a particular case,"' 56 a
consideration "even more compelling in view of today's crowded
dockets." 57
The willingness of a strong majority of the Court to endorse such a
sweeping condemnation of the flexible application of res judicata, long
assumed by leading commentators and courts58 to be an important
safety valve for a potentially harsh doctrine that "renders white black,
the crooked straight," 59 is of paramount importance. Yet the Moitie
decision contains a number of other peculiarities and ironies. In re-
sponse to plaintiff's contentions that they had raised only state law
claims in Brown II that should not be barred by the Brown I judgment
on their federal claims, Justice Rehnquist concluded that it was "un-
necessary for [the] Court to reach that issue" because it was sufficient
that "Brown I is res judicata as to respondents' federal law claims." 60
But as Justice Brennan persuasively pointed out in his dissenting opin-
ion,61 Brown II raised only state law claims of fraud, unfair business
practices, restitution, and civil conspiracy. How then could the major-
ity have found it unnecessary to resolve the question of whether the
state law claims in Brown II were barred? The answer lies in the
Court's cursory and questionable disposition of the latent removal
issue.
As noted, 62 the briefs before the court only tangentially addressed
the removal issue.63 At oral argument the Justices evidenced consider-
55. Moide, 452 U.S. at 400.
56. Id. at 401.
57. Id. However, Justices Marshall and Blackmun, in their concurrence, made clear
that they "would not close the door upon the possibility that... the doctrine of res judicata
must give way to what the Court of Appeals referred to as 'overriding concerns of public
policy and simple justice." But they found that such "equitable tempering" was inappro-
priate in the Moftie case because respondents had made a "deliberate tactical decision" to
forego a federal appeal. 452 U.S. at 402-03 (Blackmun, J., joined by Marshall, J., concur-
ring). Justice Blackmun further emphasized the "special need for strict application of res
judicata in complex multiple party actions of this sort so as to discourage 'break-away' liti-
gation." Id.
58. lB J. MooRE & T. CURRIER, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.405[11] (2d ed.
1982) [hereinafter cited as MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE]. See, e.g., Adams v. Pearson, 411
Ill. 431, 104 N.E.2d 267 (1950); White v. Adler, 289 N.Y. 34, 43 N.E.2d 798 (1942).
59. lB MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 58, 0.405[12], at 787 (citing Jeter v.
Hewitt, 64 U.S. (22 How.) 352, 364 (1859)).
60. Moitie, 452 U.S. at 402.
61. Id. at 404 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
63. The Moide majority, however, cannot be faulted for reaching the removal issue.
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able confusion as to the basis for removal.64 With such limited atten-
tion given to the issue in the opinions below and in the briefs and
arguments, it is not surprising that Justice Rehnquist's opinion brushed
aside this important issue in a single footnote expressing agreement
with the court of appeals that "at least some of the claims had a suffi-
cient federal character to support removal. ' 65 Justice Rehnquist also
noted the district court finding that respondents "had attempted to
avoid removal by 'artfully' casting their 'essentially federal law claims'
as state law claims" and that "[w]e will not question here that factual
finding."' 66 In support of this "artful pleading" doctrine, the Court
cited a section of the Wright, Miller, and Cooper treatise and three
district court opinions.67 As discussed in the next section, the Court's
reliance on these authorities was misplaced.68
Incongruities abound in Moitie. Justice Rehnquist, a dedicated
advocate of "Our Federalism" 69 and the need to give free rein to the
interests of state sovereignty,70 in Moitie authored an opinion support-
ing a questionable extension of federal jurisdiction in derogation of
those concepts. Justice Rehnquist, assumed to be a judicial conserva-
Contrary to Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion, 452 U.S. at 402, it did not matter that
the Brown II plaintiffs had not cross-petitioned for review of that issue, for it is an appellate
court's duty to resolve the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction on its own motion should that
issue come to its attention. Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. v. Swan, Ill U.S. 379, 382 (1884). See
also Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). It would also have
been inappropriate for the Court to overlook the removal issue on the theory, recognized in
American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 16-18 (1951), that a party may waive
objections to removal jurisdiction if not timely asserted, provided the district court would
have had subject-matter jurisdiction over the action if originally commenced in federal
court. If the Brown II claims were truly state law claims, then no original subject-matter
jurisdiction existed.
64. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, 10, 16, Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moi-
tie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981).
65. Mo/tie, 452 U.S. at 397 n.2.
66. Id.
67. 14 WRIGHT AND MILLER, supra note 18, § 3722, at 564-66; In re Wiring Device
Antitrust Litig., 498 F. Supp. 79 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Three J Farms, Inc. v. Alton Box Board
Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,423 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd, 609 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980); Prospect Dairy, Inc. v. Dellwood Dairy Co., 237 F. Supp.
176 (N.D.N.Y. 1964).
68. See infra text accompanying notes 89-123.
69. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). See also Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415,
423-24, 429-31 (1979); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 334-37 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,
420 U.S. 592, 599-603 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 479-82 (1974) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring).
70. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662, 669 (1974); see also National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840-46 (1976).
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tive71 and an avowed statutory "strict constructionist, '72 was joined by
a strong majority of the Supreme Court in an expansive and virtually
unprecedented reading of the removal statute,73 despite the Court's
prior admonition that "due regard for the rightful independence of
state governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that
they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits
which the statute has defined. ' 74 This result was reached, moreover, by
endorsing a purported "factual finding" of the district court that plain-
tiffs' state law claims had a "federal character," even though in llAote
the determination of the plaintiffs to assert state law claims was clear.75
Moreover, as other commentators have pointed out, had the plain-
tiffs' state law claims truly been "federal in character," then presuma-
bly they would have arisen under the federal antitrust laws, as did the
Brown I complaint.76 That being true, the Lambert Run doctrine77
would have required the district court to dismiss the "federal" claims in
Brown II for want of jurisdiction, as jurisdiction over claims arising
under the federal antitrust laws lies exclusively in federal court78 and
the district court's jurisdiction on removal is purely derivative from
state court jurisdiction.79 Although the long-standing criticism of the
Lambert Run doctrine might lead the Supreme Court to repudiate it in
an appropriate case,80 the Moitie majority did not cite, much less pur-
71. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: .4 Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 299
(1976).
72. See, e.g, United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 121 (1980).
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976).
74. Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934).
75. Justice Brennan's dissent argued that under these circumstances the character of
plaintiff's claims presented a legal question. Moitie, 452 U.S. at 409 n.5 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
76. See 14 WRIGHT AND MILLER, supra note 18, § 3722 (citing cases); State v. Ameri-
can League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 460 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1972).
77. Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). Ac-
cording to the Lambert Run doctrine, if a state court lacks jurisdiction, the federal court
acquires none since the removal jurisdiction of the federal court is derivative.
78. Blumenstock Bros. Advertising Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co., 252 U.S. 436, 441
(1970). See also Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 583 F.2d 378, 379 (7th Cir. 1978);
Cream Top Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358, 363 (6th Cir. 1967).
79. Venner v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 271 U.S. 127, 131 (1926) (citing Lambert Run Coal
Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 258 U.S. 377 (1922)). See also 14 WRIGHT & MILLER, Supra
note 18, § 3721, at 521 n.35.
80. See 14 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 3721, at 520-24; A.L.I., STUDY OF THE
DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS: OFFICIAL DRAFT
§§ 1312(d), 1317(b), 1382(e) (1969) (proposing a change in the Lambert Run doctrine to
allow retention of such a case).
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port to overrule, Lambert Run in the course of its footnote affirmance
of the district court's assumption of removal jurisdiction.
Justice Brennan addressed his vigorous dissent in Molide almost
entirely to the removal issue.81 He noted that, under the established
principle that the plaintiff is the master of his own complaint,8 2 "where
the plaintiffs claim might be brought under either federal or state law,
the plaintiff is normally free to ignore the federal question and rest his
claim solely on the state ground" thus precluding federal question re-
moval.8 3 The artful pleading doctrine, Justice Brennan argued, was in-
applicable because it was limited to situations in which Congress had
preempted the field and entirely supplanted state law, leaving plaintiffs
no "option" to proceed on a state law theory. 84 As Justice Brennan
pointed out, the federal antitrust laws do not generally preempt appli-
cation of state tort or antitrust theories, 85 and there was no basis for
concluding that preemption could be found under the specific facts of
the Mo/tie case. 86
The Motie majority's characterization of the state claims before it
as "federal in nature" created an important weapon for defendants at-
tempting to neutralize, through removal, the threat of break-away state
antitrust litigation.87 Federal district courts cannot be expected to casu-
ally brush aside the Mo/ie footnote.88 For that reason it is essential to
examine the artful pleading doctrine as developed prior to Moitie to
determine whether it supports the Court's decision on the removal
issue.
The Inapplicability of the Artful Pleading Doctrine As A Basis
For Removal of Antitrust Actions
As noted, Justice Rehnquist's cursory treatment of the removal is-
sue in Mo/ie relied on three trial court opinions and a statement in the
Wright, Miller & Cooper treatise that courts "will not permit plaintiff
to use artful pleading to close off defendant's right to a federal forum
81. Moitie, 452 U.S. at 406-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. See supra note 27. See also The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22
(1913) (involving original jurisdiction).
83. Moitie, 452 U.S. at 407 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 407-08.
85. Id. at 409. See also infra notes 93-98 & accompanying text.
86. Moitie, 452 U.S. at 409.
87. See supra note 26 & accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Iowa v. Binney & Smith, Inc., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) j 64,781 (S.D.
Iowa 1982); Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 525 F. Supp. 566, 572 (N.D. Cal.
1981), appealpending, Nos. 82-4067, 82-4113 (9th Cir. argued and submitted Dec. 17, 1982).
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. . . [and that] occasionally the removal court will seek to determine
whether the real nature of the claim is federal, regardless of plaintiff's
characterization. ' 89 On this authority the Moitie majority declined to
question the trial court's "factual finding" that "at least some" of the
removed claims "had a sufficient federal character" to support
removal. 90
This analysis constitutes an expansion of the "artful pleading"
doctrine as historically developed in the federal courts. The circum-
stances in which removal is proper under that doctrine were not present
in Moitie, and they are not present in the break-away state antitrust
context generally. As the next sentences of the Wright, Miller &
Cooper treatise explain:
[I]n many contexts plaintiff's claim may be one that is exclusively
governed by federal law, so that the plaintiff necessarily is stating a
federal cause of action, whether he chooses to articulate it that way
or not. If the only remedy available to plaintiff is federal, because of
preemption or otherwise, and the state court necessariy must look to
the federal law in passing on the claim, the case is removable regard-
less of what is in the pleadings. If, however, there is a choice between
federal and state remedies, the federal courts will not ignore the
plaintiff's choice of state law as the basis for the action.91
As discussed below, even this version of the artful pleading doctrine is
too broad, although there are cases that could be read to support it.92
The following two subsections demonstrate that 1) the federal antitrust
laws do not preempt state laws, and 2) even if there were federal pre-
emption in some circumstances, removal would not be justified.
The Absence of Preemption in the Antitrust Field
Even giving the artful pleading cases their broadest meaning, they
do not support removal when the plaintiff has a real choice between
state and federal law as a basis for recovery. In the antitrust area,
plaintiffs do have such a choice. It is settled that the federal antitrust
laws were not intended to displace state antitrust enforcement. 93 As
Senator Sherman explained in 1890, the Sherman Act was designed to
89. 14 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 3722, at 564-66.
90. Moide, 452 U.S. at 397 n.2.
91. 14 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 3722, at 566-69 (emphasis added).
92. See, e.g., Sheeran v. General Elec. Co., 593 F.2d 93, 96 (9th Cir. 1979); Johnson v.
England, 356 F.2d 44, 47 (9th Cir. 1966); Billy Jack For Her, Inc. v. New York Coat, Suit,
Dress, Rainwear & Allied Workers' Union, 511 F. Supp. 1180, 1187-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
Bailey v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 1139, 1141 (C.D. 11l. 1979); Rettig v.
Arlington Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819, 823 (N.D. IM. 1975).
93. See, e.g., New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 111 (1978);
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978).
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supplement state law.94
Recognizing this general absence of federal preemption under the
antitrust laws, the Ninth Circuit in In re Sugar Antitrust LitigationO
respected the plaintiffs' choice of a state forum. The court held that
state indirect-purchaser claims by previously unsuccessful federal
plaintiffs are not removable. 96 Defendants had argued that the state
plaintiffs were attempting to "circumvent" the unfavorable federal rul-
ing and that the district court had acted to avoid "the chaos that...
would result from simultaneous prosecution of complex state and fed-
eral actions pursuing the same relief. '97 The court of appeals con-
cluded that "[t]o deny remand under these extraordinary circumstances
amounts to federal preemption of the antitrust laws by judicial act
where it is conceded that there is no congressional preemption. '98
Thus, removal of concurrent state antitrust proceedings because
the state plaintiff is or has been a plaintiff in a federal antitrust action
ordinarily cannot be supported. The Moitie Court acknowledged
neither the legislative intent that federal antitrust laws supplement state
law, nor the compelling reasoning of the Sugar Antitrust decision.
The three district court decisions relied upon in the Moitie foot-
note99 provide no better support than the Wright, Miller & Cooper
treatise for the Court's broad interpretation of the artful pleading doc-
trine to allow removal. Two of the cases involved break-away suits
brought under the South Carolina antitrust law, which had previously
been construed to apply only to purely intrastate commerce.°0 As the
break-away complaints concededly involved interstate commerce, it
94. This bill [the Sherman Act].. . has for its single object to invoke the aid of
the courts of the United States to deal with the combinations described... and in
this way to supplement the enforcement of the established rules of the common and
statute law by the courts of the several States in dealing with the combinations that
affect injuriously the industrial liberty of the citizens of these States. It is to arm
the Federal courts within the limits of their consitutional power that they may co-
operate with the State courts in checking, curbing, and controlling the most dan-
gerous combinations that now threaten the business, property, and trade of the
people of the United States.
21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890) (statement of Senator Sherman) (emphasis added).
95. 588 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979).
96. Id. at 1273-74.
97. Id. at 1272.
98. Id. at 1273.
99. In re Wiring Device Antitrust Litig., 498 F. Supp. 79 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Three J
Farms, Inc. v. Alton Box Board Co., 1979-I Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,423 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd,
609 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980); Prospect Dairy v. Deliwood
Dairy Co., 237 F. Supp. 176 (N.D.N.Y. 1964).
100. In re Wiring Device Antitrust Litig., 498 F. Supp. at 82; Three J Farms, Inc. v.
Alton Box Board Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 76,550.
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was clear that no state claim existed: there was no substantial, non-
frivolous state law claim upon which plaintiff could choose to rely.' ° '
In the third case, the wording of the complaint virtually tracked the
language of the Sherman Act and section 303 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, and the complaint asserted violations not only of
state law but also of "such other [applicable] provisions of law, both
under federal and state mandate."' 02 The theory of the case was thus
highly ambiguous. When a plaintiff does not clearly assert his determi-
nation to stand on his concurrent state rights, there seems little reason
for a federal court to be unduly indulgent in respecting his choice of
forum.'0 3
Neither the Wright, Miller, & Cooper treatise nor the three district
court cases cited in the Moitie removal footnote justify invoking the
artful pleading doctrine as a ground for removal on the facts of Moitie.
The circumstances in which the artful pleading doctrine does justify
removal involve clear and complete federal preemption. These circum-
stances are not generally present in antitrust cases. To be sure, in a few
cases, most involving professional sports, state antitrust regulation has
been held to be inconsistent with the commerce clause because the
dominant interstate character of such businesses requires uniform na-
tional regulation.'0 4 But such decisions fall far short of establishing
any general preemption doctrine in the antitrust field, and no such
commerce clause conflict was involved in Moitie itself.
A more difficult preemption issue is presented when the break-
101. In re Wiring Device Antitrust Litig., 498 F. Supp. at 83; Three J Farms, Inc. v.
Alton Box Board Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 76,550-51.
102. Prospect Dairy v. Dellwood Dairy Co., 237 F. Supp. at 178 (emphasis added).
103. See, e.g., Vitarroz Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 644 F.2d 960, 964 (2d Cir. 1981). itarroz
involved a trademark infringement and unfair competition suit brought in the New York
Supreme Court. Defendant removed the case to United States District Court. Vitarroz
made no motion to remand. On that basis, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded
that removal was proper, reasoning that "by not contesting jurisdiction at an early stage, we
think the plaintiff permitted the District Court to exercise jurisdiction, since the Court was
entitled to conclude that the plaintiff was willing to see its trademark infringement claim
treated as one based on federal law." The court also noted that "[hlad the plaintiff resisted
removal ... we think federal juridiction would have been defeated. . . .We acknowledge
that this approach is a slight departure from the usual rule of testing whether a claim arises
under federal law strictly from the face of the complaint." Id. at 964.
104. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284-85 (1972); Alexander v. National Foot-
ball League, 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,730, at 72,983 (D. Minn. 1977); Robertson v.
National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Partee v. San Diego
Chargers Football Co., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,642, at 73,497 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982);
HMC Management v. New Orleans Basketball Club, 375 So. 2d 700, 706 (La. App. 1979);
Matuszak v. Houston Oilers, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Wisconsin v.
Milwaukee Braves, 31 Wis. 2d 699, 721, 144 N.W.2d 1, 18 (1966).
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away state plaintiffs are indirect purchasers who have no federal claim
under the Illinois Brick rule.105 Section 4 of the Clayton Act, as con-
strued in Illinois Brick, is at odds with state laws permitting recovery by
indirect purchasers. However, in light of the legislative history cited
above, 106 such inconsistency is no ground for federal preemption.
The Impropriety of Removal Even if There Were Preemption
Even assuming that the Illinois Brick rule might ultimately be held
to preempt some applications of state antitrust laws on policy
grounds,10 7 removal should be denied. The assertion of Professors
Wright, Miller, and Cooper that federal preemption may provide a ba-
sis for removal because the plaintiff would then have no "choice" to
ground his complaint in state law108 ignores their previous recognition
that whether a case "arises under" federal law for the purpose of the
removal statute is governed by the same principles that apply to origi-
nal federal question jurisdiction. 10 9 In order for federal question juris-
diction to exist, a federal question must be an essential part of the
plaintiff's own claim for relief, and the assertion of a federal defense-
such as preemption-does not convert a state law claim into a federal
105. See supra notes 7-8 & accompanying text.
106. See supra note 94 & accompanying text.
107. It could be asserted that enforcement of state indirect-purchaser statutes would
stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress," Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), in enacting the federal
antitrust laws, and is preempted on that ground. See, e.g., Doe v. Plyler, 457 U.S. 202, 225-
26 (1982); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978). This contention, while
not entirely without foundation, should probably be rejected. The primary basis for the
Supreme Court's narrow gloss on section 4 of the Clayton Act in Illinois Brick was its fear
that permitting complex "pass-on" theories of recovery infederal court would unduly com-
plicate, and thus undermine, the deterrent effect of the federal private treble damage rem-
edy. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 725 (1977). The fact that a state court may
be willing to entertain such complex litigation does not present the same danger of compli-
cating the federal proceedings.
One residual concern remains, however. If a concurrent state indirect-purchaser action
were to proceed to judgment before the federal direct-purchaser case, it is possible that a
federal court might deny recovery to direct-purchaser plaintiffs on the theory that section 4
of the Clayton Act or due process of law prohibits duplicative recovery for the same over-
charge. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 73-77, 80 (1961); Union
Carbide Corp. v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. App. 3d 443, 448-54, 183 Cal. Rptr. 318, 322-23
(1982). This possibility might deter some federal direct-purchaser actions. However, this
concern seems somewhat removed from the immediate focus of the Illinois Brick rule con-
cerning the adverse consequences of additionally complicating the federal proceeding itself.
108. See supra text accompanying note 91.
109. 14 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 3722, at 546-48 (citing Gully v. First Nat'l
Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936); Gibbs v. Crandall, 120 U.S. 105 (1887); Burgess v. Charlottesville
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 477 F.2d 40 (4th Cir. 1973)).
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one. 1 0 On just that ground, several of the federal courts of appeals
have rejected the artful pleading doctrine as a ground for permitting
removal on the basis of a federal preemption defense to the asserted
state law claims."'
One line of decisions, however, 12 has permitted removal of sup-
posed state claims when a federal cause of action clearly supplants state
causes of action. In AVCO Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, InternationalAsso-
ciation of Machinists,l1 3 the Supreme Court upheld the removal of a
state contract law action seeking an injunction to enforce a no-strike
clause in a collective bargaining agreement. The Court noted that,
under its decision in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mrils, 114 the Labor
Management Relations Act mandates that claims under that act are
governed by federal law, not state law. The Court concluded that "[i]t
is thus clear that the claim under this collective bargaining agreement
is one arising under the 'laws of the United States' within the meaning
of the removal statute," and that the federal district court thus had
"original jurisdiction" over the suit. 1 5 The AVCO Court apparently
based its approval of removal upon the clarity of the exclusively federal
character of the plaintifFs artfully pleaded state claim.
In Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust
(FTB),"16 the Supreme Court distinguished AVCO in rejecting the de-
fendant's argument that federal preemption justified removal. The de-
110. 14 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 3722, at 546-52 (citing Arkansas v. Kansas
& Tex. Coal Co., 183 U.S. 185 (1901); Seneca Nursing Home v. Kansas State Bd. of Social
Welfare, 490 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1974); Norton Coal Co. v. UMWA Dist. 28, 387 F. Supp.
50 (D.C. Va. 1974)).
111. Trent Realty Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 657 F.2d 29 (3d Cir. 1981);
Guinasso v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 656 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1020 (1982); Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 635 F.2d 797 (10th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981); First Nat'l Bank v. Aberdeen Natl Bank, 627 F.2d
843 (8th Cir. 1980); Yawn v. Southern Ry., 591 F.2d 312 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934
(1979); La Chemise La Coste v. Alligator Co., 506 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 937 (1975). See also Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 422 F. Supp. 1346 (D.
Minn. 1976).
112. See AVCO Corp. v. Aero Lodge 357, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968);
McKinney v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 624 F.2d 745 (6th Cir. 1980); Fristoe v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1980); Sheeran v. General Elec. Co., 593 F.2d
93 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); Johnson v. England, 356 F.2d 44 (9th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 961 (1966); Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 98 F.
Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
113. 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
114. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
115. AVCO Corp. v. Aero Lodge 357, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 390 U.S. at 560 (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)) (emphasis added).
116. 103 S. Ct. 2841 (1983).
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fendants claimed that ERISA 17 preempted enforcement of California
state income tax laws with respect to the assets of a trust subject to
ERISA.1 8 The FTB Court confirmed that "a case may not be removed
to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense
of preemption."'1 9 The Court stated that
[t]he necessary ground of decision [in AVCO] was that the preemp-
tive force of [the labor statute] is so powerful as to displace entirely
any state cause of action .... Any such suit is purely a creature of
federal law. . . . AVCO stands for the proposition that if a federal
cause of action completely preempts a state cause of action any com-
plaint that comes within the scope of the federal cause of action nec-
essarily "arises under" federal law.1 20
Since ERISA "does not purport to reach every question relating to
plans covered by ERISA," and since ERISA "makes clear that Con-
gress did not intend to preempt entirely every state cause of action re-
lating to such plans,"' 2 ' AVCO was distinguished, and the Court held
that removal was improper.
The Supreme Court's emphasis on the clarity of an exclusively
federal cause of action as the basis for removal supplies the proper link
with traditional artful pleading doctrine. Just as a diverse plaintiff may
not avoid removal by fraudulently concealing his status, so a party
whose only substantial, non-frivolous claim is federal may not avoid a
federal forum by deleting all references to the only law that could ac-
cord him relief. As Justice Brandeis stated in the Lambert Run case:
[W]hile it is true that a plaintiff by his first pleading determines what
right he will sue on and that the defense[s] set up ... can not affect
the jurisdiction when it depends on that right, yet the plaintiff may
not, by alleging a frivolous claim or a fictitious situation, confer upon
a court jurisdiction which, as determined by the plaintiffs real cause
of action, it has not.' 22
To permit a litigant to bypass what is clearly an exclusive federal reme-
dial scheme by maintaining a frivolous state court action would under-
mine the very purpose of the federal statute.
117. ERISA is an acronym for the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976).
118. FTB, 103 S. Ct. at 2845.
119. Id. at 2848 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 2853-54 (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 2855. It should be noted that, to the extent that this language suggests that
the merits of the preemption claim must be resolved in order to determine whether removal
jurisdiction exists, the FTB Court departed from the approach generally taken to determine
federal subject-matter jurisdiction. See cases cited infra at note 123. The FTB Court should
have reached the conclusion it did simply on the ground that there was a colorable state
claim and therefore no clear federal preemption.
122. Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 383 (1922).
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In other words, the artful pleading doctrine should be invoked to
support removal only when the state law claims are frivolous. This
limitation comports with prevailing doctrine in analogous areas. For
example, an insubstantial or frivolous federal question has been held to
be insufficient to bring an essentially state law case into federal court
for resolution on the merits; 2 3 likewise, a frivolous assertion of rights
grounded in state law should be insufficient to avoid a federal forum
and force the defendant to raise the primacy of federal law by way of
defense in state courts.
Clearly, cases such as AVCO are inapposite in the antitrust context
because such cases involve federal statutes that, unlike the antitrust
laws, clearly create exclusively federal causes of action. Further, legiti-
mate antitrust claims arising under state law are neither insubstantial
nor frivolous, and thus should not be removable on the basis of the
artful pleading doctrine.
In summary, the Moitie majority had little or no support for its
cursory removal analysis. The Court failed to consider the history of
the artful pleading doctrine, the lack of federal preemption of state an-
titrust laws generally, and the decisions holding that a defense of fed-
eral preemption provides no basis for removal. Viewed in this light,
the lower federal courts should not treat the Moitie footnote as the last
word on the question of artful pleading and the removability of break-
away state antitrust actions.
Salveson v. Western States Bankeard Association: One Court's
Attempt to Reconcile Moitie with Established Law
The most thoughtful judicial analysis to date of the Moitie Court's
application of the artful pleading doctrine is Judge Schwarzer's opinion
in Salveson v. Western States BankcardAssociation ,124 now pending on
appeal before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 2 5 In Salveson,
Judge Schwarzer considered motions to remand two unrelated cases
that had been removed from California state courts solely on the theory
that the state claims were federal in nature. In one of the cases, Allied
Finance Adjusters,126 plaintiffs had originally brought suit in California
superior court alleging that defendant repossession companies had en-
123. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946); Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109
(1936); see also Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv.
157, 166-68 (1953).
124. 525 F. Supp. 566 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
125. Nos. 82-4067, 82-4113 (9th Cir. argued and submitted Dec. 17, 1982).
126. R.C.I.A. Local 1228 Credit Union v. Allied Fin. Adjusters Conference, Inc., 525 F.
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tered into a conspiracy in restraint of commerce in violation of Califor-
nia state antitrust law and the California Unfair Practices Act. 27 The
removal petition was based on plaintiffs' reliance on the federal anti-
trust claims by the United States against the same defendants and the
interstate nature of defendants' activities.128 In the other case,
Salveson, plaintiffs had originally filed a federal antitrust action alleg-
ing that the defendants had unlawfully conspired to exclude plaintiffs
from the national credit card market. 129 The federal district judge in
that original action granted summary judgment for the defendants on
the ground that the statute of limitations had run. 30 Plaintiffs there-
upon commenced an action in California superior court, alleging seven
counts based on the Cartwright Act and common law theories of fraud,
fraudulent inducement to contract, misappropriation of plaintiffs' pro-
grams and ideas, interference with business relations, and breach of
contract.' 3 1 Defendants removed. 32
In resolving the removal question in bothAllied Finance Adjuslers
and Salveson, Judge Schwarzer narrowly interpreted the Moitie foot-
note. He recognized that "the removal statute is strictly construed,"' 33
that the "plaintiff is master of his claim, and may choose what law to
rely on,"' 134 that "[flederal jurisdiction does not exist ...simply be-
cause the subject matter of the action could give rise to a federal law
claim as well as a state law claim," 135 and that "the court is not free to
recharacterize plaintiff's complaint or to implement policies, such as
coordination with pending multidistrict litigation, which, though desir-
able, lie beyond the scope of the removal statute."' 36 This was true
even if plaintiff's state claims "were copied from other parties' plead-
ings grounded on federal law."' 137
In Judge Schwarzer's view, the artful pleading doctrine as applied
Supp. 566 (N.D. Cal. 1981). The court's opinion in Salveson and Allied Finance Adjusters
will be cited hereinafter as Salveson.
127. Id. at 570. The Unfair Practices Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101
(West 1964 & Supp. 1983), prohibits unfair, dishonest, deceptive, destructive and discrimi-
natory business practices, including "locality discrimination," "below cost sales," use of
"loss leaders," and secret rebates, as defined in the Act.
128. Salveson, 525 F.Supp. at 570.
129. Id. at 577-78.
130. Id. at 578.
131. Id. at 570, 578.
132. Id. at 570.
133. Id. at 571.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 574.
136. Id. at 575.
137. Id.
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to state antitrust actions was consistent with established principles in
only two situations: when plaintiffs allegations plainly exceeded the
scope of the state statute relied upon, and thus necessarily arose under
federal law if they arose at all, 138 and more importantly, when "plain-
tiff has previously asserted substantially the same claim as a federal
antitrust claim."139 Noting that the Supreme Court had been primarily
concerned with the res judicata issue in Moitie and that "the Court did
not explain why plaintiff's state court complaint could be characterized
as artful pleading," Judge Schwarzer concluded that "more was in-
volved than simply that the claim made under state law could also have
been made under federal law."' 4 Indeed,
[t]he critical element in Moitie was that Brown had previously filed
the identical claims as federal claims in the federal court. Having
once exercised his option to assert these claims as federal rather than
state claims, Brown could not later retreat from that decision to the
prejudice of defendants. For the effect of permitting Brown to prose-
cute the same claims under state law in the second action would have
been to impair the ability of defendants to assert the federal resjudi-
cata defense against those claims.14
According to Judge Schwarzer, this limited construction of Moitie
was "the only one that could be squared with the established law...
governing plaintiffs control over his pleadings." 142 He then remanded
the Allied Finance Adjusters case on the ground that the plaintiffs had
not previously asserted the federal claim and thus "have a right to as-
sert their antitrust claims, even if they affect interstate commerce, under
the Cartwright Act, regardless of whether they could also have been
asserted under the Sherman Act." 143 In Salveson, however, Judge
Schwarzer denied remand because the "gravamen" of plaintiffs' state
claims was the same as that of their previously dismissed federal
claims, and "[p]laintiffs could have asserted that claim initially under
the Cartwright Act. They chose, however, to proceed under the Sher-
man Act. . . thereby invoking this Court's jurisdiction." 144
Judge Schwarzer's effort to reconcile the Moiuie removal holding
with the removal statute and prior authority is subject to challenge on
the ground that the general removal statute authorizes removal of cases
138. Id. at 575. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
139. Salveson, 525 F. Supp. at 575.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 575 n.8.
143. Id. at 577.
144. Id. at 578.
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only if they "arise under" federal law. 45 The fact that a plaintiff was
unsuccessful in asserting a previous federal claim does not in itself im-
ply that his successive claim based on state law theories "arises under"
federal law. To be sure, such an effort to relitigate invokes the policy
concerns that underlie the doctrine of res judicata. But the fact that the
state court defendants may have a res judicata defense based upon the
effect of the prior federal decree under the supremacy clause 146 pro-
vides no basis for removal. 147
Despite Judge Schwarzer's protestations to the contrary, 148 the
Salveson decision in effect imposed an "irrevocable election of reme-
dies" in order to promote the goal of efficient judicial administration.
This goal in itself provides no basis for removal under existing law.
Perhaps the result would be supportable if Judge Schwarzer had been
correct in concluding that prosecution of state law claims in state court
following the adverse disposition of a prior federal action would "im-
pair the ability of the defendants to assert the federal res judicata de-
fense against those claims." 149 In fact, there is no such impairment.
The res judicata defense is fully available in state courts. 150 Existing
authority would support a claim of merger or bar in such circumstances
with far less strain on established principles of federal jurisdiction than
is inherent in the Moitie version of the artful pleading doctrine.
Alternative Procedural Vehicles for the Control of Duplicative
State Antitrust Proceedings
Res Judicata
Res judicata is preferable to removal as a method of preventing
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1976).
146. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. See generally 18 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18,
§ 4468, at 648-59.
147. The assertion of a federal defense to a state law claim generally provides no basis
for removal. See supra note 110 & accompanying text. But see Villarreal v. Brown Express,
Inc., 529 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1976) (the "6 million dollar tire" case), a case characterized by
the court of appeals as seeking relief from a prior federal judgment awarding recovery on
claims of fraud. In affirming removal jurisdiction, the court held that such an action was
properly brought in federal court only under rule 60(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and that "[a] party may not fraudulently evade removal by drafting a complaint
so that the true purpose of the law suit is artfully disguised." Id. at 1221.
148. Salveson, 525 F. Supp. at 575 ("the court is not free to recharacterize plaintif's
complaint or to implement policies, such as coordination with pending multidistrict litiga-
tion, which, though desirable, lie beyond the scope of the removal statute").
149. Id.
150. 1B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 58, 0.406, at 901-10 (citing Stoll v.
Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938); Hancock Nat'l Bank v. Farnum, 176 U.S. 640 (1900)).
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duplicative state antitrust litigation. The doctrine of res judicata pre-
cludes relitigation in state court of state law claims that were or could
have been brought in a prior federal action as pendent claims, provided
the state law claims arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as
the adjudicated federal claim. 151
It is difficult to understand Judge Schwarzer's reservations in
Salveson concerning the availabililty of the res judicata defense based
on a prior federal judgment. The supremacy clause requires a federal
judgment to be accorded the same preclusive effect in state court as it
would receive in the courts of the United States. 152 Indeed, in Salveson
itself Judge Schwarzer used the doctrine of res judicata in dismissing
several of plaintiffs' state law claims on the ground that they arose out
of the same transactions as plaintiffs' prior federal antitrust claims,
153
and therefore were barred (even though they had not been raised in the
federal action) because they could have been asserted under the doc-
trine of pendent jurisdiction. 54
The questions remain whether the doctrine of res judicata may be
unavailable in some cases on the ground that the scope of a federal
district court's pendent jurisdiction does not include all of the tradi-
tional state law claims that might be asserted on the same facts, or be-
cause the "cause of action" for res judicata purposes in the federal
antitrust action may not comprise all such state claims, or because the
parties are different in the federal and state actions.155
In analyzing these questions, a distinction must be drawn between
cases in which the indirect purchasers are named plaintiffs or class
members in the initial federal action, and those in which they are not.
In the latter context, the doctrine of res judicata does not preclude relit-
igation by persons not parties to the prior action.' 56 When the same
parties are involved, however, neither the limited scope of federal pen-
dent jurisdiction nor the res judicata concept of "cause of action" un-
duly restricts the availability of the res judicata defense as a means to
151. See generally 18 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 4411.
152. 18 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 4468, at 648-49. See also Degnan, Federal-
ized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741, 744-50 (1976).
153. Saleson, 525 F. Supp. at 582-83.
154. Id. at 580, 582.
155. These concerns are heightened in the context of state antitrust or tort actions by the
standing given indirect purchasers who have no federal cause of action under Illinois Brick.
If such claims are not cognizable in federal court, how can the federal judgment bar a subse-
quent action in state court by such indirect purchasers? The procedural devices that defend-
ants might use to avert concurrent state litigation by non-parties to the federal action are
discussed infra text accompanying notes 263-322.
156. See generally 18 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 4448.
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counter break-away state antitrust actions when the state plaintiffs seek
to avoid the force of a prior federal decree. The recent decision of the
California Court of Appeal in Boccardo v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 57 illus-
trates this point.
In Boccardo, a number of cattlemen filed class action complaints
in federal district courts across the country, alleging that the defendant
retail food stores had conspired to depress beef prices paid to meat
packers, and that the packers had in turn passed on these "un-
dercharges" in the form of lower prices paid to the plaintiff cattlemen.
The Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation transferred all of the ac-
tions for consolidated pre-trial proceedings to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas. 58 The district court granted
defendants' motions to dismiss Boccardo and the other similar com-
plaints, apparently on the ground that the Illinois Brick preclusion of
suits by indirect purchasers applied equally to prevent claims by "indi-
rect sellers". 159 The plaintiffs in all the actions but Boccardo appealed
the judgments of dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. 160 The Boccardo plaintiffs, after unsuccessfully mov-
ing the Texas district court for post-dismissal leave to amend their
complaint to allege state antitrust violations under the California Cart-
wright Act, 161 proceeded to file a new action based on exactly the same
facts in California superior court.162 They alleged a violation of the
Cartwright Act, 163 which had been amended in the wake of Illinois
Brick to permit claims by indirect purchasers. 64 Plaintiffs also as-
serted state law claims for interference with economic relations, "civil
conspiracy," unfair competition, fraudulent business practices, and
restitution. 165
The superior court dismissed the action on the ground that the
Boccardo plaintiffs had improperly "split" a single cause of action and
that their state law claims were barred by the unappealed federal judg-
157. 134 Cal. App. 3d 1037, 184 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1982).
158. In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 419 F. Supp. 720 (J.P.M.D.L. 1976) (per curiam).
159. Boccardo, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 1040, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 9. See In re Beef Indus.
Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1153 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1981) (the
district court did not file an opinion, but stated from the bench that dismissal was based on
Illinois Brick).
160. In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1152 (5th Cir. 1979).
161. Boccardo, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 1040, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
162. Id. at 1037, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
163. Id. at 1041, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
164. See supra note 12.
165. First Amended Complaint at 18-20, Boccardo v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 134 Cal.
App. 3d 1037, 184 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1982).
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ment. 166 The California Court of Appeal affirmed. 167 The primary is-
sue 68 regarding the res judicata effect of the federal judgment in
Boccardo was the failure of the Boccardo plaintiffs to timely allege
their state law claims in the federal action, and the consequent uncer-
tainty about whether the federal district court would have exercised its
pendent jurisdiction to hear and determine the state law claims had
they been alleged at the outset. 169 This question arose from the gener-
ally accepted proposition that a judgment has no preclusive effect on a
claim over which the rendering court had no jurisdiction, 70 and the
corollary that a federal court's discretionary refusal to exercise pendent
jurisdiction over a state claim does not bar further litigation of the state
claim in state court. 171
In the Boccardo case there was no question but that the plaintiffs'
federal claims and their subsequent Cartwright Act and state tort theo-
ries arose from a "common nucleus of operative fact"'172 within the
meaning of United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs.173 The state
claims therefore would have fallen within the pendent jurisdiction of
the federal district court had they been alleged at the outset of the fed-
eral action. Moreover, Boccardo is a clear example of a case in which a
plaintiff's claims, "considered without regard to their federal or state
character, . . . are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try
them all in one judicial proceeding."' 74 Thus, had the federal action
proceeded to judgment on the merits after full trial, that judgment
would have precluded subsequent federal and state actions based on
the same "cause of action," as to every matter that was raised and every
matter that might have been raised. 75
166. Boccardo, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 1042-43, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 906-07.
167. Id. at 1053-54, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 914.
168. The court easily resolved in the affirmative the question of whether a rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted constituted a judg-
ment "on the merits" for res judicata purposes. Id. at 1041-42, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 906 (quot-
ing lB MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 58, 0.409[2], at 1003).
169. Id. at 1044-54, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 909-14.
170. See IB MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE , supra note 58, 0.405, at 634-35; see also
Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
171. Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, 454 F.2d 1292, 1297 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Boccardo, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 1046, 184 Cal.
Rptr. at 909.
172. Boccardo, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 1044-45, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
173. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
174. Id. at 725.
175. Id. at 724 (citing Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 320, 321 (1927)).
The extent of the preclusive effect of a judgment depends in part upon the definition of
"cause of action" or "claim." Application of the broad "transactional" definition of a
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The fundamental question in Boccardo, and in break-away state
antitrust actions generally, is whether a federal district court'spre-trial
disposition of jurisdiction-conferring federal antitrust claims deprives
the federal court of jurisdictional power to hear and resolve pendent
state antitrust and tort claims arising from the same facts. 176 If the dis-
trict court retains such power, the question remains whether and to
what extent the court's discretion under Gibbs to decline to exercise
pendent jurisdiction should preclude a res judicata bar to a state law
claim that the plaintiff could have but did not raise in the federal
action. 177
In Gibbs, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's discretionary
decision to retain jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims, despite
the trial court'spost verdict dismissal of the jurisdictional federal claim.
The Supreme Court observed in dictum: "Certainly, if the federal
claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a
jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well. 17 8
This categorical pronouncement has been widely followed in the lower
"claim" adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, which would bar "all rights of
the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transac-
tion, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose," RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1980), is appropriate in the context of break-away state
antitrust actions. As the Restatement implicitly recognizes, id. § 24(2), the definition of
"cause of action" for the purpose of determining the scope of claim preclusion should not be
based on the traditional but intellectually arid process of defining "primary rights" or duties,
id. § 24 comment a. Instead, the determination should reflect a court's normative judgment
about what claims should be resolved in a single action, "giving weight to such considera-
tions as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form
a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expec-
tations." Id. § 24(2). In this regard the law of res judicata mirrors the theory of pendent
jurisdiction articulated in Gibbs, under which pendent jurisdiction depends on the court's
assessment of whether "a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to
try them all in one judicial proceeding." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
176. When this question was addressed on remand in the Moitie case, the Ninth Circuit
applied the Restatement's transactional approach to hold that, even had plaintiffs alleged
state tort theories in Brown II, they would be barred by the dismissal of the federal antitrust
claims in Brown I. Brown v. Federated Dep't Stores, 653 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1981). In the
Salveson case, Judge Schwarzer similarly concluded that "[a] subsequent action advancing a
different legal theory based on the same events and injuries is barred by a final decision in
the first action where that theory could have been argued as an alternative or additional
ground for recovery." 525 F. Supp. 566, 582 (N.D. Cal. 1981). And in Harper Plastics, Inc.
v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 657 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1981), a Seventh Circuit panel, while recog-
nizing that exclusive reliance on whether claims "arise out of the same basic factual situa-
tion" might prove "too much" in other settings, had no difficulty in concluding that a break-
away state contract claim was barred by the previous dismissal of a federal antitrust claim
based on precisely the same facts. Id. at 944-45.
177. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27.
178. Id. at 726 (emphasis added).
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courts.179 The language suggests that it would constitute an abuse of
discretion, if not an act in excess of jurisdiction, for a federal court to
adjudicate pendent state claims following pre-trial dismissal of the fed-
eral claims. If this were true, pre-trial dismissal of federal antitrust
claims would preclude litigation in federal court of pendent state law
claims, and would thus pose no bar to subsequent litigation of those
state law claims in state court.
That the Supreme Court's dictum in Gibbs cannot be taken at face
value is evident from its subsequent decision in Rosado v. Wyman.180
The Rosado Court sustained the discretion of the district court to hear
and resolve a challenge to state welfare regulations that were allegedly
inconsistent with federal statutory provisions, notwithstanding the pre-
trial dismissal, on the ground of mootness, of the jurisdiction-confer-
ring constitutional claim. The Court noted that in the district court's
determination of the mootness issue, "substantial time and energy have
been expended looking toward the resolution of a dispute that plaintiffs
were entitled to bring in federal court."' 8'1 The Court concluded: "We
are not willing to defeat the common sense policy of pendent jurisdic-
tion-the conservation of judicial energy and the avoidance of multi-
plicity of litigation-by a conceptual approach that would require
jurisdiction over the primary claim at all stages as a prerequisite to
resolution of the pendent claim."18 2
Rosado involved a pendent federal claim, and the Court acknowl-
edged that "the statutory question is so essentially one 'of federal policy
that the argument for exercise of pendent jurisdiction is particularly
strong.' "183 Yet the practical considerations of judicial administration
at the core of Rosado are not confined to pendent federal claims. En-
couraged by Rosado, a substantial number of decisions in the courts of
appeals have affirmed the discretion of federal district courts to hear
and resolve pendent state law claims following pre-trial disposition of
jurisdiction-conferring federal claims when the trial court has ex-
pended substantial time and effort prior to its decision on the federal
179. See, e.g., Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254, 261 (9th Cir.
1977); Nolan v. Meyer, 520 F.2d 1276, 1280 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1034
(1975); Nash & Assoc. v. Lum's of Ohio, Inc., 484 F.2d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 1973); Calderone
Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1297 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
180. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
181. Id. at 404.
182. Id. at 405 (footnote omitted).
183. Id. at 404 (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 727 (1966)).
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claim. 184
The California Court of Appeal inBoccardo 18 5 adopted the princi-
ples of the Rosado case and its progeny, and the position of the Re-
statement (Second) of Judgments. The Restatement takes the position
that subsequent state actions based on the same cause of action should
be precluded unless the state court in the second proceeding concludes
that the court in the prior federal action "would clearly not have had
jurisdiction to entertain the omitted theory or ground (or, having juris-
diction, would clearly have declined to exercise it as a matter of
discretion)."' 186
The Boccardo court held that the subsequent state antitrust and
tort claims were barred because the jurisdiction-conferring federal
claim was substantial and because it was not apparent that the federal
court would have declined to assume and retain jurisdiction over the
state claims had they been properly alleged in the federal action. 187
The California court distinguished the federal cases that apparently re-
quired dismissal of pendent claims on the basis that the jurisdiction-
conferring federal claims in those cases had been dismissed before
there had been "substantial expenditure of the court's time and energy
on the case."' 88 By contrast, in the Boccardo action in federal court "a
substantial amount of time and energy had been expended prior to the
dismissal of the federal complaint."' 89 "Thus, although it is possible
that the federal court would have dismissed a Cartwright Act claim
without prejudice to a later state action, we cannot say that it was clear
184. See, e.g., Financial Gen. Bankshares v. Metzger, 680 F.2d 768, 773 n.8 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (state claim tried after federal claims settled or dismissed); North Dakota v. Merchants
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 634 F.2d 368, 371 (8th Cir. 1980) (state claim decided on remand
after dismissal of federal claims affirmed); Lentino v. Fringe Employee Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d
474,479-80 (3d Cir. 1979) (state claim tried after federal claim dropped on morning of trial);
Transok Pipeline Co. v. Darks, 565 F.2d 1150, 1155 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
1006 (1978) (state claims decided injury trial after federal claims settled before trial; court of
appeals asserted that "[i]t would be a shocking waste of time and money now to require this
cause to be relitigated in the state court"); Brunswick v. Regent, 463 F.2d 1205, 1206-07 (5th
Cir. 1972), cert denied, 410 U.S. 942 (1973) (state claims tried after federal claims dropped at
pretrial conference); Gray v. International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators Local 51, 447
F.2d 1118, 1120 (6th Cir. 1971) (state claim decided at jury trial on remand after dismissal of
federal claims affirmed); Gem Corrugated Box Corp. v. National Kraft Container Corp., 427
F.2d 499, 501 n.l (2d Cir. 1970) (state claim decided at jury trial after federal claims dis-
missed by stipulation of the parties).
185. 134 Cal. App. 3d 1037, 184 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1982).
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 comment e (1980).
187. Boccardo, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 1045, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
188. Id. at 1052, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
189. Id. at 1053, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 914.
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that the court would have done so."190
A substantial argument can be made that even broader preclusive
effect should be accorded the federal judgment by requiring that the
federal litigant join all his state law claims over which the federal court
would have had power to exercise pendent jurisdiction. As the Re-
porter for the Restatement observed: "In cases of doubt, it is appropri-
ate for the rules of res judicata to compel the plaintiff to bring forward
his state theories in the federal action, in order to make it possible to
resolve the entire controversy in a single lawsuit."'19 The Boccardo
court recognized that such a rule would "eliminate the guesswork nec-
essarily involved in determining how the federal court would have ex-
ercised its discretion because the federal court in each case would have
had the opportunity to determine whether pendent jurisdiction should
be imposed."' 92 There seems little reason to allow state antitrust plain-
tiffs to gamble on favorable post-trial analysis of preclusion when the
federal court was available at the outset to resolve all of their claims in
a single proceeding.1 93
At least one federal court has adopted the less exacting standard of
the Restatement. In its 1981 decision in Harper Plastics, Inc. v. Amoco
Chemicals Corp. ,194 the Seventh Circuit held that a break-away state
contract action was barred by a prior federal dismissal of a Robinson-
Patman 95 claim based on the same facts. The court reached its conclu-
sion without any elaborate inquiry into whether the federal court
would have assumed or retained pendent jurisdiction over the state
contract claim had it been included in the federal complaint. The court
stated:
We fail to discern the unfairness in requiring a plaintiff to join all
relevant theories of relief in a single proceeding. The uncertainty
over whether a trial judge would exercise pendent jurisdiction does
not justify permitting the institution of a multiplicity of proceedings
which may have the effect of harassing defendants and wasting judi-
cial resources. If appellant entertained any doubts at the pleading
stage, they should have been resolved in favor of joinder.'9 6
Against this backdrop, there is no basis in the cases, the scholarly
190. Id.
191. RESTATMENT (SEcOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 reporter's note (1980).
192. Boccardo, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 1051, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
193. See id. at 1051-52, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 912-13 (citing Harper Plastics, Inc. v. Amoco
Chem. Corp., 657 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1981)).
194. 657 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1981).
195. Clayton Act § 2(c), as amended by Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15
U.S.C. § 13(e) (1982).
196. Harper Plastics, Inc. v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 657 F.2d at 946.
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authority, or the precepts of federalism for declining to accord full res
judicata effect to a federal court's pre-trial dismissal of federal antitrust
claims. Such use of res judicata will preclude subsequent state antitrust
and tort litigation that is instituted by the unsuccessful federal plaintiffs
and is based on the same wrongful conduct and injury, even if new
theories not asserted in the federal action are raised.
Injunctions or Stays of Concurrent State Litigation Involving the Same
Parties
Despite the broad preclusive effect of a prior federal judgment on
state law tort claims as illustrated by Boccardo, there is still potential
for duplicative federal and state litigation. First, before entry of the
federal judgment there can be no res judicata barrier to the break-away
state proceedings.1 97 Second, when the state plaintiffs are indirect pur-
chasers who were "not members of any federal class," the federal judg-
ment could have no preclusive effect even when entered.1 98 The latter
problem is addressed separately in the following section. When the
break-away state plaintiffs are named plaintiffs or class members in the
federal action, however, injunctions or stays of the state proceedings
may be available prior to judgment.
injunctions
Any effort to enjoin federal plaintiffs or class members from pur-
suing concurrent state proceedings must comply with the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act. 199  Under the Supreme Court's restrictive-and much
criticized 2OO--construction of that Act in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,201 "any injunction against state
court proceedings otherwise proper under general equitable principles
must be based on one of the specific statutory exceptions to § 2283 [the
Act] if it is to be upheld. '20 2 Furthermore, because the statute "in part
197. lB MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 58, 1 0.409[1], at 1001-02. See also
United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 193 (1946); G. & C. Merriam Co. v.
Saalfiela, 241 U.S. 22 (1916); Kapiolani Estate v. Atcherly, 238 U.S. 119 (1915).
198. IB MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTiCE, supra note 58, 0.409[2], at 1001-02.
199. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976) ("A court of the United States may not grant an injunction
to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or
where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.").
200. See, e.g., Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 717
(1977); Comment, Federal Courts-Federal Anti-Injunction Statute-Injunctions in Federal
Courts to Stay Proceedings in State Courts Must Be Within One of the Statutory Exceptions to
the FederalAnti-Injunction Statute, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 616 (1971).
201. 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
202. Id. at 287.
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rests on the fundamental constitutional independence of the States and
their courts, the exceptions should not be enlarged by loose statutory
construction." 203
Of the three exceptions enumerated in the Act, the one for injunc-
tions "expressly authorized by Act of Congress '' 2°4 is plainly inapplica-
ble to break-away state actions. As discussed by the Supreme Court in
Vendo Co. v. Lektro- Vend Corp. ,205 there would be no basis in the ordi-
nary break-away state tort action commenced by federal antitrust
plaintiffs for contending that the mere maintenance of the state action
violates the federal antitrust laws or any other federal statute. More-
over, such state proceedings, even under the broadest construction of
the multiple opinions in Vendo, could not ordinarily be shown to be
part of a "pattern of baseless repetitive claims" that could constitute the
factual basis for a finding of implied congressional authorization for an
injunction.20 6
The third exception, allowing federal injunctions necessary to
"protect or effectuate" the federal district court's judgment,20 7 is
equally unavailing. This "relitigation" exception has been employed
by the federal courts to enjoin break-away state litigation when a fed-
eral judgment provides a basis for a res judicata defense in the state
proceedings.208 While, under this third exception, federal district
courts have full authority to ensure that prior federal decrees are ac-
corded claim preclusive effect, this power provides no basis for en-
joining concurrent, duplicative state litigation when no federal
judgment has been entered. 20 9
203. Id.
204. See supra note 199,
205. 433 U.S. 623 (1977).
206. Id. at 636 n.6 (quoting California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508, 513 (1972), and noting that injunctions may issue for future proceedings).
207. See supra note 199.
208. See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1332, 1335 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied sub nom. Three J Farms v. Plaintiff's Steering Comm., 456 U.S. 936
(1982); Harper Plastics, Inc. v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 657 F.2d 939, 947 (7th Cir. 1981);
Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286, 1312 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972). See generally 17 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 18, § 4226, at 340 ("the third exception does allow injunctions to prevent relitigation").
The availability of such injunctive federal relief undermines Judge Schwarzer's as-
sumption in Salveson that availability of a res judicata defense to the break-away state ac-
tion may be inadequate because the assertion of such a defense in state court is costly and
time consuming, because state courts may adopt a narrow view of the scope of the federal
cause of action, or because state courts may be unwilling to displace state tort remedies by
according broad preclusive effect to a prior federal decree.
209. See supra note 197 & accompanying text.
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The second exception is for injunctions "necessary in aid of [the
federal district court's] jurisdiction."210 In Atlantic Coast Line, the
Supreme Court endorsed the traditional doctrine that normally when
there is concurrent federal and state jurisdiction in actions in per-
sonam, "neither court [is] free to prevent either party from simultane-
ously pursuing claims in both courts."21' Only when the state court
action "seriously [impairs] the federal court's flexibility and authority
to decide [its] case" 212 does the statutory exception come into play. The
Court cited its earlier holding in Kline v. Burke Construction Co. 213
that, although an injunction could issue to bar subsequent state suits
involving the same "res" in actions in personam, "each court is free to
proceed in its own time, without reference to the proceedings in the
other court. '214
An instructive illustration of the difficulties posed by this narrow
construction of the second exception to the anti-injunction statute is the
Eight Circuit's controversial decision vacating the certification of a
"mandatory" federal class 21 5 in In re Federal Skywalk Cases.216 In the
wake of the collapse of an elevated walkway in a crowded Hyatt Re-
gency Hotel lobby, numerous individual lawsuits were commenced in
federal and Missouri state courts seeking both compensatory and puni-
tive damages. The federal district court certified a "mandatory" rule
23(b)(1) class action, apparently because of concern that uncertain Mis-
souri state law might preclude multiple punitive damages recoveries for
the same wrong, that due process would preclude such recovery at a
certain point, or that the defendants' finite assets might limit their abil-
ity to satisfy damage awards in multiple actions. 217 In the district
court's view, these circumstances rendered certification appropriate
under both rule 23(b)(1)(A) 218 and rule 23(b)(1)(B). 21 9 On interlocu-
210. See supra note 199.
211. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'r, 398 U.S. at 295.
212. Id.
213. 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
214. Id. at 229-30.
215. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) (no provision for class members to opt out).
216. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
342 (1982).
217. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 424-25 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
218. Rule 23(b)(1)(A) permits certification of a class if there is a risk that "inconsistent
or varying adjudications. . . would establish inconsistent standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
219. Rule 23(b)(1)(B) permits certification of a class if there is a risk that individual
adjudications "would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of other members
. . . or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests." FED. R. Civ.
P. 23(b)(1)(B). See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 423-24 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
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tory appeal, the Eight Circuit vacated the class certification order on
the ground that it explicitly precluded class members from settling their
state punitive damages claims, and by necessary implication precluded
them from litigating their state court actions on the issues of liability
and punitive damages.220 In effect the majority viewed the class certifi-
cation order as a violation of the anti-injunction statute as construed in
Atlantic Coast Line and Vendo.221
Judge Heaney's strong dissent in Skywalk agreed that the neces-
sary effect of the class certification order was to preclude concurrent
state court litigation to determine liability or entitlement to punitive
damages-although he emphasized that "no plaintiff has, as yet, been
enjoined from pursuing any state court action."222 In his view, how-
ever, the same risks that rendered rule 23(b)(1) certification appropriate
in the first place also required preclusion of concurrent state court liti-
gation under the "necessary in aid of jurisdiction" exception to the
anti-injunction statute.223
Assuming that a rule 23(b)(1) class action would otherwise have
been appropriate in the Skywalk cases 224 and that the Eight Circuit was
220. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d at 1180-83.
221. Id. at 1181-83.
222. Id. at 1192 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
223. Id. As to the preclusion of independent state actions for punitive damages, Judge
Heaney would have held:
"Such a restriction is absolutely necessary to the district court's jurisdiction over
this class issue due to the applicable state law on punitive damages. Although the
parties do not agree on the certainty of the state law rule, they do agree that there is
a legitimate and reasonable claim that under Missouri law, only the first plaintiff to
achieve a judgment would obtain a punitive award-all other plaintiffs would be
frozen out. . . . When a mandatory class is necessary to protect all plaintiffs on
this claim, it seems obvious that an injunction against independent litigation of the
issue is 'necessary in aid of" the jurisdiction of the class."
Id. As to state actions on the basic liability issues, he argued:
"The mandatory class is necessary to protect the numerous defendants from incon-
sistent results and extremely burdensome reitigations of their relative culpability
and to ensure that serial determinations of liability will not deplete the assets of the
defendants.. . . Certification of the compensatory liability issue is also strictly
necessary to protect the punitive damage claim noted above because, under ordi-
nary joinder rules, an independent action on liability would necessarily reach both
compensatory and punitive issues."
Id. (citation omitted).
224. That the certification would otherwise have been appropriate is at best debatable.
Once the court determines that there is a risk of separate individual actions, it must consider
whether allowing the members to proceed on their own will expose the party to a serious risk
of being put into a "conflicted position." Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee:
1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARv. L. REV. 356, 388
(1967). It has been suggested that this requires more than a risk that separate judgments
would oblige the opposing party to pay damages to some class members but not to others or
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correct that the certification of a rule 23(b)(1) class action mandates
preclusion of duplicative state litigation by class members,225 the rever-
sal of the class certification in the face of potentially wasteful concur-
rent state litigation and inconsistent judgments attests to the continuing
vitality of Atlantic Coast Line's narrow construction of the "in aid of
jurisdiction" exception to the Anti-Injunction statute. However, the ar-
guments for broadening the narrow view of Atlantic Coast Line ex-
emplified by the majority opinion in Skywalk,226 are particularly
compelling in cases involving break-away state antitrust actions main-
tained by parties to concurrent federal proceedings.
One argument is that overcharges claimed by direct and indirect
purchasers in concurrent state and federal actions could be considered
a "res" that, under the Kline case, provides a basis for a federal injunc-
tion.227 This view posits that such simultaneous overcharge claims are
claims against a single overcharge "fund. '228 In its recent decision in
Union Carbide Corp. v. Superior Court,229 for example, the California
Court of Appeal concluded that direct purchasers were necessary par-
ties to be joined if feasible in a state indirect-purchaser action under the
Cartwright Act. The court viewed
the alleged overcharges caused by price fixing in this case as a 'com-
mon fund.' Petitioners sold each container of gas only once and al-
legedly overcharged only once for each sale. The issue to be decided
is who is entitled to recover damages for the alleged over-charge
It is true that here the 'common fund' is not a specifically identi-
fied trust fund or collection of royalties. But the alleged overcharge
is something that must be proven and identified at trial in order for
damages to be recovered. It is also a fund to which there may be
conflicting claims. 230
The difficulty with this approach is that it would bring almost any
to pay them different amounts as typically would be the case in the mass disaster situation.
See Comment, Rule 23: Categories of Subsection (b) in the Class Action-A Symposium, 10
B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 539 (1969). See also In re Northern Dist. of Cal. Dalkon
Shield IUD Prods. Liability Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817
(1983) (decertifying a nationwide class of punitive damage claimants).
225. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d at 1180. The Skywalk court cited Reynolds
v. National Football League, 584 F.2d 280, 283 (8th Cir. 1978), for the proposition that
parties to a mandatory class are not free to initiate actions in other courts to litigate certified
issues. That result is not clearly required by the case cited or rule 23.
226. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d at 1181-83.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 213-14.
228. See Alton Box Board Co. v. Esprit De Corp., 682 F.2d 1267, 1270-73 (9th Cir. 1982)
(argument of appellant-manufacturer).
229. 133 Cal. App. 3d 443, 183 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1982).
230. Id. at 451, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
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duplicative in personam action within the Kline res exception. Apart
from a settlement fund that may have been created for administration
by the court, there is no preexisting res that constitutes the object of
such actions within the contemplation of Kline.231 The supposed res is
only the sum of all damages that might be recovered in related in per-
sonam actions. As Judge Wallace of the Ninth Circuit concluded in
Afton Box Board Co. v. Esprit De Corp. ,232 "the analogy to the in rem
cases is strained. '233
The A ton Box Board court nevertheless was sensitive to the equi-
ties favoring a federal defendant's application for injunctive relief
when the same overcharges are alleged in multiple suits:
The manufacturers argue creatively that an injunction is neces-
sary to aid the district court's jurisdiction because Esprit's state Cart-
wright Act class action involves a claim to the same 'common fund-
the amount of the alleged overcharge,'. . . over which the multidis-
trict litigation court is charged with determining the rights and liabil-
ities of the parties thereto. This argument is persuasive. It highlights
the risk that Esprit's state suit may result in the 'duplicative recov-
eries' condemned by the Supreme Court. . . . Its defect is that it
runs to the merits. With respect to the issue of whether the district
court had jurisdiction under the Anti-Injunction Act, it is not on
point.2 34
This analysis is overly constricted. As the court itself acknowl-
edged,235 there are a number of contexts in which federal courts have
invoked the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception notwithstanding the ab-
sence of a res in the Kline sense.2 36 The threat of duplicative recovery
that Judge Wallace found "persuasive" inAfton Box Board,237 and that
prompted the Union Carbide court to conclude that direct purchasers
were necessary parties to the indirect-purchaser action before it,238
should be viewed as a highly relevant factor in the determination of the
proper scope of the Anti-Injunction Act. Giving weight to the threat of
duplicative recovery would not be plainly contrary to the language of
the Act. The Supreme Court itself has suggested that an injunction
might be proper when a concurrent in personam proceeding in state
231. See supra notes 213-14 & accompanying text.
232. 682 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982).
233. Id. at 1272 (affirming denial of federal injunction against state indirect purchaser
action on other grounds).
234. Id. (citations omitted).
235. Id. at 1272 n.8.
236. See supra notes 213-14 & accompanying text.
237. See supra text accompanying note 234.
238. See supra text accompanying note 230.
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court interferes with the disposition of a pending federal case. In At-
lantic Coast Line the Court stated:
While this language ['necessary in aid of its jurisdiction'] is admit-
tedly broad, we conclude that it implies something similar to the con-
cept of injunctions to 'protect or effectuate' judgments. Both
exceptions to the general prohibition of § 2283 imply that some fed-
eral injunctive relief may be necessary to prevent a state court from
so interfering with a federal court's consideration or disposition of a
case as to seriously impair the federal court's flexibility and authority
to decide that case.239
There are strong arguments that break-away state antitrust ac-
tions, particularly those maintained by members of a federal class ac-
tion, pose precisely such a serious impairment of the federal court's
ability to decide the multidistrict litigation before it. Of course, so long
as Kline retains any vitality, the mere burden of duplicative litigation
or the prospect that an in personam state judgment may have some
claim- or issue-preclusive effect in the pending federal litigation does
not by itself constitute such an impairment. 240 But the problems of ju-
dicial administration posed by break-away state litigation go well be-
yond the burden to the parties or the res judicata effect of any ultimate
judgment that is entered. Conflicting pre-trial orders are a distinct pos-
sibility, perhaps permitting litigants in one forum to circumvent restric-
tions on privilege and discovery in the other. In addition, the very
pendency of the state proceedings may significantly complicate and
perhaps entirely frustrate efforts to streamline the federal case through
simplification of the issues or through comprehensive settlement. In an
era when pre-trial procedures have come to dominate the progress of
complex federal litigation and active judicial management of the
crowded federal docket is widely viewed as essential,241 such difficulties
cannot be dismissed as concerning only the parties; they can also "im-
pair the federal court's flexibility and authority to decide"242 a case.
239. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'r, 398 U.S. at 295. To
confine Atlantic Coast Line's "in aid of jurisdiction" exception to true in rem actions would
be to ignore the policies underlying the statute and its exceptions in favor of a mechanical
categorization. For just that reason, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), rejected the
ancient doctrine sharply differentiating in rem from in personarn actions in resolving ques-
tions of territorial jurisdiction. The same analysis commands abandonment of such an arti-
ficial distinction under the Anti-Injunction Act.
240. See Redish, supra note 200, at 745.
241. See, e.g., COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC. AND PROC. OF THE JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S.,
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PRO-
cEDUR 2-28 (1981) (June 1981 preliminary drafts of Rules 7, 11, 16, 26 with accompanying
advisory committee notes). .But see Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374
(1982).
242. See supra text accompanying note 239.
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Moreover, when there is potential for duplicative recovery of an
overcharge in state indirect-purchaser proceedings, the authority of the
federal district court to decide its case on the merits may be frustrated
by the effect of any state judgment. In Illinois Brick, the Supreme
Court stated explicitly that it would not permit recovery of the same
overcharges by both direct and indirect purchasers: it was "unwilling
to 'open the door to duplicative recoveries' under section 4."243 Assum-
ing that the Illinois Brick rule, although not preempting state indirect-
purchaser claims, expresses a federal policy of preventing duplicative
recovery of damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act for the same
overcharge by both direct and indirect purchasers, a prior state judg-
ment permitting recovery by indirect purchasers would preclude the
federal court from awarding damages to the direct purchasers before it,
despite proven liability and harm.244
Even if the foregoing analysis of the Anti-Injunction Act is re-
jected, federal antitrust defendants are not helpless. The primary area
of abuse indicated by the cases has been the subsequent initiation of
state proceedings by disgruntled federal plaintiffs. The anti-injunction
statute merely prohibits federal injunctions of pending state proceed-
ings. 245 It would not prevent a federal court from enjoining the parties
to a federal action from subsequently initiating state court actions
based on the same cause of action, when such claims could be asserted
under the pendent jurisdiction of the federal court. The maintenance
of such subsequent actions would not necessarily infringe any right of
the federal defendants. Nonetheless, the federal court's interests in
sound judicial administration and in avoiding harassing or burden-
some duplicative state court litigation provide ample bases for en-
243. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 731 (1977).
244. In this respect the situation is closely akin to that involved in decisions permitting
federal courts, in insurers' actions for declaratory judgment of noncoverage, to enjoin state
actions seeking recovery under the policy being contested. Redish, supra note 200, at 748-
50. In both settings the practical effect of the state judgment could be to make the federal
proceeding meaningless. Id. at 743-53. In addition, if direct-purchaser recovery were pre-
cluded by a prior state judgment, the primary goal of promoting the deterrent function of
the private treble damage remedy would be frustrated. The very possibility that the direct
purchaser would be forced to accept a reduced damage award in a particular case, or, at a
minimum, to relitigate the correctness of the state court's pass-on determinations, would
affect the incentives of direct purchasers to file federal actions. This prospect of undermin-
ing control of federal treble damage recovery by direct purchasers would impair the federal
court's ability to decide the case before it by undercutting the preferential position to which
direct purchasers were elevated by lllinois Brick.
245. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). See also P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H.
WECHSLER, HART AND WESCHLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
1236 (2d ed. 1973).
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joining such litigation when the proscriptions of the Anti-Injunction
Act do not apply. In the Skywalk cases, for example, all the judges
suggested that, absent thependency of state proceedings, a broad in-
junction prohibiting members of the federal class from initiating con-
current state court actions based on the same accident and injuries
would have been appropriate. 246
Finally, entirely apart from the express prohibitions of the Anti-
Injunction Act, it might be argued that the Younger v. Harris247 doc-
trine of equitable restraint248 precludes a federal injunction of pending
or threatened state proceedings in the interest of "Our Federalism. 249
In light of the Supreme Court's interpretation of Younger, this argu-
ment is unconvincing. In an effort to maintain the delicate balance of
competing federal and state concerns, the Supreme Court has limited
the scope of the Younger doctrine to criminal or "quasi-criminal" cases,
and to civil proceedings (such as state bar disciplinary proceedings) 250
involving "important state interests."' 25' There is little reason to con-
clude that private damage actions under state antitrust laws would or
should be held to fall within that category. A federal court's power to
enjoin such actions in state court is, therefore, not diminished by
Younger.
In sum, when the same parties are involved in duplicative state
and federal actions, a federal court's power to enjoin state break-away
antitrust litigation may provide an effective alternative to removal. Be-
cause it applies only topending state proceedings, the Anti-Injunction
Act poses no obstacle to federal injunctions against the initiation of sub-
sequent state proceedings. And, when a federal court judgment has
been entered in a prior proceeding, the exception to the Anti-Injunction
Act for injunctions "necessary to effectuate" that judgment comes into
play. Finally, despite the narrow interpretation generally given the
"necessary in aid of jurisdiction" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act
with respect to pending state proceedings, the Supreme Court should
recognize that the strong policies favoring judicial economy and pro-
tection of parties from harassing, duplicative litigation necessitate a
246. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d at 1180, 1184.
247. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
248. Under the judicially created doctrine of "equitable restraint," a federal court may
refuse to enjoin concurrent state proceedings tven when the Anti-Injunction Act does not
compel such restraint.
249. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 43-44.
250. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
251. Id. at 434-35.
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broader interpretation of that exception in the context of break-away
state antitrust litigation.
Stays
As an alternative to a federal injunction, federal defendants may
seek a stay of break-away state actions initiated by past or present fed-
eral plaintiffs pending the entry of a federal judgment. Some state
courts have been reluctant to grant stays in favor of concurrent federal
proceedings, particularly when there is not a close identity of issues.
These courts presumably believe they have an obligation to exercise
their jurisdiction to provide justice to litigants who have stated a claim
for relief under state law.252 This position is true to the Kline Court's
admonition that "[e]ach court is free to proceed in its own way and in
its own time, without reference to the proceedings in the other
court. ' 25 3 However, in light of the increasing overlap between federal
and state regulatory and penal laws in such areas as antitrust, securi-
ties, and civil rights, and the resulting complex problems of federalism
and judicial administration, this approach disregards modem realities.
State courts would abdicate none of their authority or responsibility by
staying the exercise of their jurisdiction in favor of the federal forum in
circumstances similar to those presented in Moiie,254 Boccardo,255 or
Salveson.256 Such stays would be particularly appropriate because
only the federal court can provide a comprehensive resolution of all
disputes between the parties, given the exclusive jurisdiction of federal
courts over federal antitrust claims.257 Moreover, if the state plaintiffs
are already parties to the federal action they will not be additionally
inconvenienced by being forced to litigate all of their related claims in
the federal forum, or by suffering the res judicata effect of any ultimate
federal judgment if they do not.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Colorado River Water Con-
252. See, e.g., Sessions Co. v. W.A. Scheaffer Pen Co., 344 S.W.2d 180, 184-85 (rex. Civ.
App. 1961). See generally Annot., 56 A.L.R. 2d 335 (1957); LATER CASE SERVICE, 56-63
A.L.R. 2d §§ 5,7. On the other hand, a number of state courts have recognized discretion to
defer to prior federal proceedings in appropriate circumstances in the interests of comity and
sound judicial administration. LATER CASE SERVICE, 56-63 A.L.R. 2d § 6. See also Gen-
eral Aniline & Film Corp. v. Bayer Co., 305 N.Y. 479, 485, 113 N.E.2d 844, 847 (1953);
Sparrow v. Nerzig, 228 S.C. 277, 89 S.E.2d 718 (1955).
253. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230 (1922).
254. See supra text accompanying notes 31-88.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 157-77.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 124-50.
257. Cream Top Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358, 363 (6th Cir. 1967).
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servation District v. United States258 provides a proper model of judicial
effort to avoid piecemeal litigation of state and federal claims.
Notwithstanding the apparent limitation of its holding to water rights
issues, 259 the Colorado River Court evidenced a willingness to engage in
a sensitive, multifaceted inquiry to accommodate the competing con-
cerns of federal supremacy, the state's interest in the subject matter,
and sound judicial administration. In addition to its particular concern
with the "clear federal policy [opposed to] piecemeal adjudication of
water rights in a river system, '260 the Court noted:
In assessing the appropriateness of dismissal in the event of an exer-
cise of concurrent jurisdiction, a federal court may ... consider such
factors as the inconvenience of the federal forum. . . ; the desirabil-
ity of avoiding piecemeal litigation. . . ; and the order in which ju-
risdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums. . . . No one
factor is necessarily determinative; a carefully considered judgment
taking into account both the obligation to exercise jurisdiction and
the combination of factors counselling against that exercise is
required.261
Colorado River is only the most recent illustration of the historic
willingness of federal courts to dismiss or stay actions otherwise within
their jurisdiction if state proceedings appear, on balance, to present a
better forum for the comprehensive disposition of all related litigation
arising out of a single transaction.262 Hopefully, state courts will recip-
rocate in the context of break-away state antitrust litigation by plain-
tiffs who can only obtain a comprehensive disposition of all of their
claims in previously filed federal litigation to which they are parties.
258. 424 U.S. 800 (1976). The case involved conflicting state and federal water rights
proceedings. Despite the Court's conclusion that the case did not fall within any of the
traditional abstention doctrines, id. at 813-17, and its recognition of the "virtually unflagging
obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them," id. at 817, the major-
ity upheld the discretion of the federal district court to dismiss proceedings involving Indian
and United States water rights in favor of concurrent state proceedings for reasons of "[w]ise
judicial administration," id. at 819.
259. Id. at 819.
260. Id. at 820.
261. Id. at 818-19 (citations omitted).
262. See Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491 (1942); Langnes v. Green, 282
U.S. 531 (1931); P. Beiersdorf & Co. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951); Mottolese v.
Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949). Cf. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1
(1972) (upholding enforcement of contractual forum selection clause against contention that
it improperly ousted the trial court's jurisdiction). But cf. Moses S. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Const. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 927 (1983) (holding that a federal district court had abused
its discretion in staying an action seeking to compel arbitration under the United States
Arbitration Act when no substantial proceedings had occurred in a previously filed state
action involving the same issue, that a stay would not avoid piecemeal litigation, that federal
law applied to the dispute, and that state remedies were probably inadequate).
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Procedural Devices to Avert Concurrent State Litigation by Non-Parties to
the Federal Action
The preceding discussion suggests that a broad reading of the re-
moval statute is unnecessary to prevent the burden, harassment, and
potential for duplicative liability that may ensue when a named federal
plaintiff or member of a federal class attempts to obtain a "second bite
at the apple" by instituting parallel state proceedings based on the same
wrongful conduct and injury. The issues become more complex when
state plaintiffs are not parties to the federal case and particularly when
they are indirect purchasers asserting claims that are not cognizable in
federal court under Illinois Brick.2 63
It is important to emphasize that the force of the argument for
federal hegemony seems considerably reduced in this context. The
plaintiff is not seeking to evade the federal forum that alone can resolve
all of the plaintiffs federal and state claims. The state plaintiff has no
federal law claims to resolve.264 There are, nonetheless, substantial
practical reasons that would justify defense efforts to block state pro-
ceedings. If simultaneous indirect-purchaser actions are permitted to
proceed without regard for federal actions by the direct purchasers, ef-
forts to achieve a comprehensive settlement in the federal actions may
be frustrated by the possibility of duplicative recoveries. The risk of
overlapping liability is substantial since the state plaintiffs could not be
bound by the judgment in a federal action to which they were not par-
ties, and the federal court would not be barred from awarding recovery
to direct purchasers because of the res judicata effect of a previous state
judgment involving other parties.265 To avoid such results, defendants
might make use of the procedural devices considered below: statutory
interpleader, conventional party joinder, and class action.
Statutory Interpleader
Statutory interpleader, with its provisions for nationwide service of
process 266 and requirement of only minimal diversity and reduced ju-
risdictional amount,267 immediately comes to mind as a potential solu-
263. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). See supra text accompanying note
8. See also Alton Box Board Co v. Esprit De Corp., 682 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982) (discussed
supra text accompanying notes 232-37).
264. See In re Sugar Antitrust Litig., 588 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1978).
265. Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 524 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. Ill.
1981), modifying 496 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. Ill. 1980). But see infra text accompanying notes
275-77.
266. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 2361 (1976).
267. Id. § 1335(a)(1).
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tion to the non-party problem. However, the traditional role of
interpleader is "to protect against double vexation in respect to a single
liability.' 268 Thus interpleader may be inappropriate when, as here,
federal and state laws vest the cause of action in different classes of
purchasers for the impact of a single price-fixing conspiracy, so that
double liability derives from two independent systems of substantive
law. Even if this difficulty could be overcome, antitrust defendants
seeking to interplead all claimants would be required to pay treble the
aggregate amount of the claimed overcharges269 into the registry of the
court, or provide a bond payable in that amount.270 In view of the
sums involved in typical nationwide antitrust class action proceedings,
it is doubtful that many defendants would be willing or able to pursue
this approach.
Party Joinder
Apart from statutory interpleader, the federal courts may be able
to compel party joinder to achieve a comprehensive disposition of all
direct- and indirect-purchaser claims arising from an antitrust conspir-
acy. In Union Carbide Corfp. v. Superior Court,271 the California Court
of Appeal reasoned that, under the California counterpart of federal
rule 19,272 direct purchasers were necessary parties to a state court ac-
tion instituted by indirect purchasers because both direct and indirect
puchasers were claiming a right to recover from a common overcharge
fund and the defendants could not be required to pay twice for the
same overcharges. 273
As previously discussed, 274 this reasoning is not entirely persua-
sive. There is no existing "fund" to which there are conflicting and
necessarily mutually exclusive claims. Instead, state and federal laws
have independently vested causes of action for the same wrongful con-
268. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 494 (4th ed. 1983) (emphasis added) (citing State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 534 (1967)). Cf. supra note 217. On the
other hand, if defendants could establish that federal and state liability are indeed mutually
exclusive, either on statutory or constitutional grounds, interpleader should be available to
prevent double vexation with respect to that single liability.
269. See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) (giving private antitrust plaintiffs the
right to treble damages).
270. 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(l)-(2) (1976).
271. 133 Cal. App. 3d 443, 183 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1982).
272. Both the federal and California rules of civil procedure define "persons to be joined
if feasible." FED. R. Civ. P. 19; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 389 (West 1973).
273. Union Carbide Corp. v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. App. 3d at 448-53, 183 Cal. Rptr.
at 321-23.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 229-33.
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duct in different parties. It is unclear whether California would permit
recovery by indirect purchasers if the full amount of the overcharge
had already been recovered in a federal court by direct purchasers.
Conversely, as previously suggested,275 the language of Illinois Brick
stongly implies that a federal court should be reluctant to award dupli-
cative recovery to direct purchasers when indirect purchasers have al-
ready recovered damages on a pass-on theory in state proceedings.
276
Moreover, due process considerations might preclude such duplicative
liability even if it were otherwise statutorily permitted.2
77
While these questions have not been resolved, the 1966 amend-
ments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 were intended to empha-
size that pragmatic considerations should govern compulsory party
joinder. The advisory committee specifically noted that "[t]he interests
that are being furthered here are not only those of the parties, but also
that of the public in avoiding repeated law suits on the same essential
subject matter."278 Rule 19(a)(2) does not require an absolute certainty
of duplicative liability, but provides that absent persons should be
joined, if possible, when a disposition in their absence may leave ex-
isting parties subject to "a substantial risk. . . of double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations. ' 279 Moreover, if state courts con-
strue local antitrust statutes as precluding recovery by indirect purchas-
ers when direct purchasers have already recovered for the same
overcharge in a prior federal action, joinder of the indirect purchasers
in the federal action should be required under the first clause of rule
19(a)(2). In such a case, disposition of the federal action may "as a
practical matter impair or impede [the indirect purchasers'] ability to
protect" their interests in state courts. 280
In short, indirect purchasers maintaining state proceedings should
be viewed as "necessary" parties to federal direct-purchaser actions
under rule 19. Yet it is doubtful that, weighing the pragmatic factors of
rule 19(b), they should be viewed as "indispensable" parties such that,
absent their joinder, "in equity and good conscience the [federal] action
...should be dismissed."' 28' As discussed below, it may be difficult to
275. See supra text accompanying notes 243-44.
276. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730 (1977).
277. See supra note 107.
278. Prop osedAmendments to Rules of CivilProcedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 91 (1966) (advisory
committee's notes to rule 19).
279. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(ii).
280. Id 19(a)(2)(i).
281. Id 19(b). Under rule 19(b), "necessary" parties are those falling within rule 19(a)
who must be joined "if possible." Rule 19(a) parties are regarded as "indispensable" only if,
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obtain personal jurisdiction over all such parties.282 Nevertheless, com-
plete relief can be granted the parties only in a federal forum,28 3 and it
may be possible to defer execution on any federal judgment to permit
resolution of indirect purchaser claims or to include protective provi-
sions in the judgment that would obviate or minimize the risk of dupli-
cative recovery.284 Thus, state indirect-purchaser plaintiffs should be
considered necessary but not indispensable parties to the federal action.
The claims of break-away state plaintiffs, whether under state tort
or antitrust laws, are typically based on the same facts and alleged
wrongful conduct by the defendants as the federal claims. There is au-
thority for the view that such claims fall within the ancillary or "pen-
dent party" subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal court because of
their close relationship to the claims already joined.28 5
The Supreme Court's decisions inAldinger v. Howard28 6 and Owen
Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroeger287 should not be read as contrary
to this conclusion. In those cases, the Court refused to extend the
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs288 concept of pendent jurisdiction to
permit the maintenance of state-law claims against either a new party
(4ldinger) or an existing non-diverse third-party defendant (Owen). In
both cases, the Court's conclusion was ultimately founded on its con-
struction of the particular jurisdictional statutes as evidencing a con-
gressional intent to foreclose subject matter jurisdiction over the type of
claims asserted. TheAidinger Court emphasized that the determinative'
question was "whether by virtue of the statutory grant of subject-matter
jurisdiction, upon which petitioner's principal claim against the treas-
urer rests, Congress has addressed itself to theparty as to whom juris-
weighing the pragmatic factors of rule 19(b) the court concludes that the action should be
dismissed if their joinder is not possible.
282. See infra text accompanying notes 307-13.
283. See Cream Top Dairy v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358, 363 (6th Cir. 1967).
284. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b). See also Advisory Committee Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 92-93
(1966).
285. See 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 1610. See also Aldinger v. Howard, 427
U.S. 1, 18 (1976); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1982); Ortiz v. United
States, 595 F.2d 65, 71-73 (1st Cir. 1979); Transok Pipeline Co. v. Darks, 565 F.2d 1150,
1154-55 (10th Cir. 1977); Shannon v. United States, 417 F.2d 256, 263 (5th Cir. 1969). But
see Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 434 U.S. 814 (1977), cert.
dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978) (rejection of pendent party jurisdiction in tort action against
United States). See generally Comment, A Closer Look at Pendent andAncillary Jurisdiction:
Toward a Theory of Incidental Jurisdiction, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1935 (1982).
286. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
287. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
288. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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diction pendent to the principal claim is sought."289 In the Court's
view, Congress had intended to exclude counties and municipalities
from the scope of the Civil Rights Act jurisdictional statute, and the
exercise of pendent party jurisdiction over the county defendent was
therefore improper.290 The Court in Owen sustained the long-standing
Strawbridge v. Curtis2 9 construction of the diversity statute as requir-
ing complete diversity of citizenship, thereby precluding the assertion
of jurisdiction over plaintiff's affirmative claim for relief against a non-
diverse third-party defendant. 292
The situation of the break-away state antitrust action maintained
by indirect purchasers is different. Section 4 of the Clayton Act both
confers jurisdiction on federal district courts without regard to amount
in controversy and creates a private right of action for damages.293 Illi-
nois Brick did not rest on the Supreme Court's conclusion that Con-
gress intended to exclude the claims of indirect purchasers from the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. Rather, the holding
represented the Court's construction of the cause of action created by
that statute in light of the necessity to enhance the deterrent function of
the private damage remedy and considerations of practical judicial
administration.294
Judge Friendly's recent opinion in Weinberger v. Kendrick295 dem-
onstrates a properly restrictive construction of the Aldinger limitation
on pendent party jurisdiction. This case involved a federal class action
that initially sought recovery on the behalf of purchasers of securities
during a specified recovery period. Plaintiffs alleged misrepresenta-
tions and non-disclosures in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.296 Subsequently, the complaint was amended to
include a proposed rule 23(b)(3) "opt-out" settlement class297 of holders
of securities during the same period. These holders, as non-purchasers
or sellers, had no federal claim but asserted state law theories of com-
mon law fraud and breach of fiduciary duty as a basis for recovery.298
289. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. at 16 (emphasis in original).
290. Id. at 17.
291. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
292. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroeger, 437 U.S. at 373-77.
293. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
294. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 737.
295. 648 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982).
296. Id. at 64.
297. Rule 23(c)(2) permits members of a class certified under rule 23(b)(3) to choose to
"opt out" and thereby to be neither bound nor benefitted by the class action judgment. FED.
R. Crv. P. 23(c)(2).
298. Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 68.
September 19831 STATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The proposed settlement would have compromised the state law claims
as well as the federal claims of the purchaser class, unless the state law
claimants elected to opt out of the class. 299 A number of members of
the "holder" class, who were also named plaintiffs in a pending state
class action asserting the same state law claims, objected to the settle-
ment on several grounds, including the federal court's alleged lack of
subject matter jurisdiction over their state law claims. Judge Friendly
rejected this argument on the ground that the state claims had a "com-
mon nucleus of operative fact" with the federal claims and fell within
the pendent party jurisdiction of the federal court.3°° He distinguished
Aldinger on the ground that the Supreme Court had recognized that
other statutes and other alignments of parties and claims might call for
a different result:
The circumstances here are about as powerful for the exercise of pen-
dent party jurisdiction as can be imagined. The exclusivity of federal
jurisdiction over claims for violation of the Securities Exchange Act
makes a federal court the only one where a complete disposition of
federal and related state claims can be rendered. . . .The concern
most frequently voiced with regard to the pendent party doctrine is
that it requres a party not otherwise subject to suit in federal court to
defend himself in that forum. . .In this case pendent party jurisdic-
tion serves. . . to extend federal jurisdiction to a new group ofplain-
tiffs. Pursuant to the opt-out procedures established by the district
court, plaintiffs who did not wish to have their claims settled in a
federal forum and in fact received notice of the settlement needed
only to request exclusion. 30'
These remarks are directly applicable in the context of the break-away
state antitrust action, as federal jurisdiction over the federal antitrust
claims is also exclusive.30 2
Judge Friendly qualified his conclusion in Weinberger by observ-
ing that any inference of congressional intent to exclude holders of se-
curities from federal litigation in order to avoid vexatious litigation was
"inapplicable when, as here, extension of pendent party jurisdiction
permits the comprehensive settlement of plaintiffs' claims. ' 30 3 This
suggests that the result might be different in litigation than in settle-
ment. A similar argument could be based on Illinois Brick's broad con-
demnation of the complexities engendered by indirect-purchaser
litigation as undermining the deterrent effect of the federal treble dam-
299. Id. at 76-79.
300. Id. at 76-77.
301. Id.
302. See supra note 78.
303. Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 77 n.15.
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age remedy.30 4 But the question in Illinois Brick was much different
than that presented by the joinder of state law indirect-purchaser
claimants to a federal direct-purchaser action.
In Illinois Brick, the Court recognized that permitting defendants
to defeat the recovery of direct purchasers by showing a pass-on could
unduly complicate the private treble damage remedy under section 4 of
the Clayton Act and thus destroy its deterrent effect.305 The joinder of
state law indirect purchaser claims in a federal direct purchaser action,
however, need not undermine the Illinois Brick result. Federal direct
purchasers should remain free to recover the entire overcharge. The
issue of any pass-on to indirect purchasers under state law, and the
effect-under state law, the supremacy clause, or the due process
clause-on their claims of any prior award of damages to the direct
purchasers, could be severed for separate trial.306 In this way, defend-
ants would only be exposed to a single determination of liability bind-
ing on all possible claimants, and all parties would have ample
opportunity to contest in a single proceeding the fundamental issue of
whether state indirect-purchaser liability can co-exist with full recovery
by direct purchasers under the federal Illinois Brick rule.
Class Action
The question of personal jurisdiction over all persons who might
possess claims as indirect purchasers under state law is a separate is-
sue.30 7 Again, however, the problems of joinder of all or substantially
all claims in the federal direct purchaser action may not be insuperable.
Although it might be impracticable individually to join all of the indi-
rect purchasers to the federal action, it is possible that they could be
joined as a class if the requirements of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were satisfied and if the class representatives were sub-
ject to the in personam jurisdiction of the federal court. Such a proce-
dure would obviate the need to effectuate service of process on each
class member.30 8 In the typical multidistrict proceeding, adequate rep-
304. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 725-26, 734-35.
305. Id. at 725.
306. FED. R. Crv. P. 42(b).
307. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694
(1982).
308. It could be argued, based on dictum in Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.
2d 478 (1981), cert. granted, 456 U.S. 914, cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 484 (1982), that all class
members, and not just the named class representatives, must have "minimum contacts" with
the state in which the district court sits if they are an "involuntary" class. See infra note 314
& accompanying text. In Miner, the Illinois Supreme Court held that all members of a state
plaintiffs' class action need not have minimum contacts with the forum. However, the court
September 1983] STATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS
resentatives of the class of indirect purchasers should be amenable to
service of process under the long-arm statutes of the various states in
which the transferor courts sit.30 9
To be sure, this procedure would not be without difficulty. The
requirements of rules 23(a) and 23(b) must be satisfied. 310 As indicated
below, while these problems of class action maintenance are far from
trivial, they are probably not insurmountable.
Under rule 23(a), not only must common questions be presented,
but the claims of the class representative must be "typical" of those of
the class, and the court must determine that "the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. ' 31' The
Supreme Court has held that these requirements together imply that
the claims of each class member must be "fairly encompassed" in the
claims of the class representatives. 312 When the pass-on theories of
various indirect purchasers involve significant factual differences, this
requirement would no doubt require limiting the scope of the federal
class proceeding to the common issue of the legal viability of such pass-
on theories in the face of direct-purchaser recovery under Illinois
Brick.313
implied that the result in a defense class action might be different. Id. at 12-13, 428 N.E.2d
at 481. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but after full briefing and argument, dis-
missed the writ of certiorari for want of jurisdiction, "there being no final judgment." Gil-
lette Co. v. Miner, 103 U.S. 484 (1982).
Assuming that a state court were required to possess "minimum contacts" with respect
to all members of an "involuntary" class under its own class action rule, one might argue
that the same requirement would apply in a federal class action brought in a district court in
that state. This argument, based on rule 4(e)-(f) that generally limits the reach of a federal
district court'sprocess to that permitted under state law, is erroneous. Class actions proceed
on the assumption that only the named representatives need be formally before the court.
Service of process on named representatives subject to the court's jurisdiction fulfills this
requirement. Thus, the question in a federal class action context is not whether service of
process is authorized as to all class members under rule 4, but whether due process of law
precludes a determination of the rights of absent class members who would be otherwise
outside the reach of the court's jurisdiction. With respect to this issue, it is generally ac-
cepted that due process limits which arise from the need to respect territorial limits on the
sovereign authority of individual state courts, see, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-94 (1980), do not apply to federal question litigation in federal
court and thus may not apply in federal antitrust class actions. Seegeneraly Berger,.4cquir-
ing in Personam Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases: Procedural Frustration under Federal
Rule of CivilProcedure 4, 1982 UTAH L. REv. 285. The petitioners in Gillette disclaimed any
application of their arguments to federal class actions. Brief for Petitioner at 15, Gillette Co.
v. Miner, 103 U.S. 484 (1982).
309. 15 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, §§ 3866-3867, at 382.
310. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(b).
311. Id 23(a)(2)-(4).
312. General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155-57 (1982).
313. Rule 23(c)(4) authorize& class actions "with respect to particular issues." See gener-
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The fact that the class representatives in such a case would be "in-
voluntary" representatives should not be fatal, for defense classes are
allowed under rule 23. 3 14 Of course, the court must give careful consid-
eration to the adequacy of representation, focusing primarily on com-
petence of counsel for the class and the close correspondence of the
claims of the absentees with those of the named representatives. 315
As to subdivision (b) of rule 23, a "common question" class action
under rule 23(b)(3) is one possibility.316 However, meeting the require-
ment of rule 23(b)(3) that common questions "predominate" over indi-
vidual questions might be difficult because of the possible necessity of
individual proof on the pass-on issues and damages. Again, however,
maintenance of an issue-limited class action would be appropriate. 31 7
This is particularly true in light of the superiority of the class action
device to resolve the fundamental issue of the effect of federal direct-
purchaser recovery on the indirect-purchaser class. 318
One might contend, however, that a significant number of mem-
bers of the class might "opt out" of any rule 23(b)(3) class action, 319
frustrating any attempt to obtain comprehensive disposition of the liti-
gation. This fear is overdrawn. Particularly in the context of a com-
prehensive settlement providing for recovery for both direct and
indirect purchasers, there would be substantial incentive to remain in
the class and receive any benefits being offered.
Moreover, it is far from clear that rule 23(b)(3) offers the only pos-
sible vehicle for class certification of indirect purchasers. A "no opt-
out" class action is available under rule 23(b)(1) when the rule 23(a)
ally 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 1790, at 187 ("[t]he theory of Rule 23(c)(4)(A)
is that the advantages and economies of adjudicating issues that are common to the entire
class on a representative basis should be served even though other issues in the case may
have to be litigated separately by each class member. Accordingly, even if only one com-
mon issue can be identified as appropriate for class action treatment, that is enough to justify
the application of the provision as long as the other Rule 23 requirements have been met.").
314. 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 1770.
315. Id. § 1770, at 658. In order to be adequate, a class representative must be a mem-
ber of the alleged class, must possess interests which are coextensive and not conflicting with
those of the class, and must be represented by competent counsel. See generally id. §§ 1765-
1770.
316. See supra note 310.
317. See generally 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 1781, at 79-83 ("since anti-
trust actions typically present many complicated issues, the courts should utilize these provi-
sions [their power under subdivisions (c) and (d) to limit the issues accorded class treatment]
to settle the common issues on a representational basis to avoid congesting the courts with
separate actions requiring the repetitive adjudication of the same matters").
318. See id. §1781, at 84-86.
319. Rule 23(d)(3) permits members of a rule 23(b)(3) class to choose not to be bound or
benefitted by the class action judgment. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(3).
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requirements are met and individual adjudications among class mem-
bers "would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the
other members not parties to the adjudication or substantially impair
or impede their ability to protect their interests." 320 Although this lan-
guage is not evidently directed to the situation of two groups whose
interests are united on the underlying question of antitrust liability but
antagonistic on the issues of impact and damages, there is no apriori
obstacle to viewing direct and indirect purchasers as subclasses of a
larger class that is united on the basic question of liability. 32' The advi-
sory committee's note states that the rule is directed toward precisely
the kind of practical prejudice that could result if recovery by one sub-
class of a larger class, antagonistic in interest to another subclass, were
permitted. In its discussion of the example of multiple claims to a lim-
ited fund, for example, the advisory committee observes that "[a] class
action by or against representative members to settle the validity of the
claims as a whole, or in groups .. meets the problem.
'322
In sum, even when actual or potential state plaintiffs are not ini-
tially members of a federal class, they frequently will be necessary par-
ties who should be joined if feasible, whose claims fall within the
subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court under the doctrine of
pendent party jurisdiction, and who may be brought within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the federal district court through the class action
mechanism. Once joined, such parties are subject to the preclusive res
judicata effect of any federal judgment on their claims. Moreover, their
efforts to undercut a comprehensive federal disposition by concurrent
state proceedings should be subject to injunction or stay.
Conclusion
Congested dockets of both federal and state courts have inevitably
led the courts to accord increasing weight to the interests of judicial
320. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
321. Courts have held that neither the stare decisis effect of individual actions nor the
mere possibility that defendant's assets may be insufficient to satisfy all individual judg-
ments justifies rule 23(b)(1) treatment. See, e.g., La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489
F.2d 461, 467 (9th Cir. 1973); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prod. Liab.
Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983). However, in the
context of break-away state antitrust litigation by indirect purchasers, recovery in federal
court by direct purchasers may legally preclude additional recovery under state law. See
infra text accompanying note 322. Such a risk of legal preclusion seems fully analogous to
the "limited fund" situation that rule 23(b)(1) was designed to deal with. See 7A WRIrGH &
MILLER, supra note 18, §§ 1773-1774.
322. Prop osedArmendments to Rules of CivilProcedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 98 (1966) (advisory
committee's notes to rule 23).
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administration in their procedural decisions, as illustrated by the res
judicata and removal decisions in Moitie. Nonetheless, the temptation
to cut the untidy "Gordian Knot" of break-away state litigation with
one thrust of the removal blade should be resisted by the federal courts.
That resolution of a very real problem is both legally questionable and
practically unnecessary. While not offering the painless simplicity of
removal, the doctrine of res judicata and the use of injunctions, stays,
and party joinder provide adequate protection for the legitimate inter-
ests of antitrust defendants subjected to such duplicative proceedings.
More importantly, by focusing explicitly on such factors as respect for
federal judgments, judicial economy, prevention of inconsistent adjudi-
cations, avoidance of prejudice to absent parties, and protection of the
federal courts' ability fully to dispose of cases, these procedural alterna-
tives enable courts to balance the conflicting interests of federalism and
sound judicial administration in antitrust and other areas of concurrent
federal-state litigation, without impairing settled principles of federal
jurisdiction.

